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Abstract
Wireless technology is fast becoming a very important tool for all aspects of
communication. An area that lacks a strong implementation for wireless communication is
the medical field. Wireless systems could be used by clinicians to be better able to
diagnose and monitor patients. The reason behind the lack of adoption in healthcare is due
to the need to meet the legislated and perceived requirements of security and privacy when
dealing with clinical information. The current methods of wireless authentication are
investigated and an existing issue in mobile networks is described and solved with two
novel solutions; one solution within GSM and the other within UMTS. Strong
authentication protocols are developed based on the existing wireless protocols, while
using minimal messages and symmetric operations to limit resource utilization to meet the
needs of the healthcare environment. To ensure the quality of the protocol a BAN
(Burrows-Abadi-Needham logic) analysis is performed which verifies that the desired
goals of the protocols are appropriately met within the results analysis. The developed
security protocol is shown to be secure, uses minimal messages to maintain efficiency and
meets the legal requirements to be used in medical wireless sensor networks.
Keywords: Medical Wireless Sensor Networks, Authentication, Integrity, Key
Agreement, BAN Analysis, Mobile, Security, Privacy, HIPAA, and PIPEDA.
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1Chapter 1
INTRODUCTION
Technological innovations for communication and computing have been advancing at
an accelerated pace. The ability to co-ordinate and communicate between many devices by
using wireless communication has had a major impact in many areas of life. One area that
has seen slow advancement is medical care. There are many concerns about the security
and integrity of the information created and stored in the systems that are being developed
to help meet the needs of clinicians and patients. Patient privacy and safety are of major
concern when applying many of the new innovations in wireless communication to the
problems faced by the medical community. The general public is concerned about how
their medical information is stored, transmitted and cared for. Clinicians are concerned
about the quality and integrity of the medical data they receive. To help alleviate the
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perceived issues of applying wireless technology to monitor patients, it is worthwhile to
investigate existing security issues in wireless networks as well as how those issues have
been resolved. By applying the experience gained from wireless deployments it will be
possible to address the concerns and requirements of clinical systems, to ensure the safety
of patients and staff.
Before wireless technology can be applied to the clinical environment, which will
bring many benefits and advantages to clinical care, the security issues need to be
addressed. The ability to remotely track patient information will allow clinicians a more
robust picture of patient health. The extended time that patient information can be gathered
will increase the understanding of the results of medical treatments and allow for stronger
refinement of those treatments to create better results overall or tailored treatments for each
patient. The technology will afford clinicians the ability to understand if a patient is in
stable or in declining health over a long period of time.
1.1 Hypothesis
This thesis will investigate the needs of wireless communication in a healthcare
setting and attempt to develop a protocol that will meet the needs of the legislation. The
protocol will also need to use a minimum number of messages to achieve its desired goals
of mutual authentication and key agreement. The protocol will avoid public key
authentication to limit resource utilization and therefore it will require the use of symmetric
operations or hashing. The protocol will need to be shown to be secure while achieving the
desired mutual authentication and key agreement.
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1.2 Methodology
To achieve the desired authentication protocol, different steps will be taken. First an
investigation of current protocols will be completed focusing on protocols that are already
in use in real world wireless communications. The protocols will be analyzed for their
strengths and weaknesses as well as addressing those weaknesses. A protocol will then be
developed that will meet the needs of the healthcare environment. The developed protocol
will then be analyzed with existing theoretical analysis tools. Once the protocol has been
successfully analyzed and shown that it meets the desired goals, we can be certain that it
has met the stated hypothesis.
1.3 Contribution
This thesis proposes two different solutions to the issues brought about by the
integration of the UMTS and GSM protocols. One solution focuses on minimal changes to
the GSM protocol by modifying the key used for encryption with the use of a cryptographic
hashing algorithm. The second solution to the problems brought about by the integration is
a modification of the UMTS protocol and the integration equations to protect the
communications. This thesis also proposes a new secure authentication protocol to be used
in medical wireless sensor networks. The protocol has a minimum number of messages to
ensure efficiency and to limit the resources needed for communication. The protocol
avoids public key cryptography to reduce the resources required for authentication by using
hashing similar to the mechanisms used in the existing UMTS-AKA protocol. The
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protocol is also found to be secure using BAN analysis to be certain it meets the desired
authentication goals.
1.4 Thesis Outline
The remainder of this thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 provides a broad
background on many of the requirements, implications, and needs of medical wireless
sensor networks (M-WSN) as well as information pertaining to security of wireless
communication. In Chapter 3 we discuss authentication in existing 802.11 and mobile
networks and the issues faced by those networks as they have adapted to new security
challenges. A scenario on how an M-WSN would be used is discussed as well as how the
authentication of the system is achieved and a formal verification that the authentication
achieves the desired results are in Chapter 4. Chapter 5 discusses other privacy concerns
and how they may be addressed. Chapter 6 concludes this thesis and offers future research
directions and suggestions.
5Chapter 2
BACKGROUND
Technology has become a required tool for informed medical care. To address the
concerns of how to properly apply our technological toolset to the medical problem space
we need to properly meet the legislated needs of the countries in which the system would
be deployed and address the privacy concerns of the patients and clinicians that will be
gathering and using the information. This will help to develop acceptable systems that will
meet the legislated needs of the organizations wishing to pursue the application of this
technology with respect to medical care. It will also help to address the concerns of
patients regarding the handling and control of their confidential information. With both the
legislated requirements and the patient concerns addressed, it will lead to adoption of the
technology to help increase the positive outcomes in patient care.
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We will also be investigating the existing frameworks of sensor networks to
understand how they handle the security concerns of each type of sensor deployment while
working within the limited resources available on sensor nodes.
2.1 Legislated Requirements
Privacy of medical information is a very important requirement as the information
has a large potential for abuse. To address the issue of privacy and security the United
States, Canada and many other countries have developed legislative requirements on how
the data can be handled by the organizations that need access to the information. Many
different organizations need information related to MSNs that are deployed with patients.
The clinicians, pharmacies and health care providers each need some, if not all, of the
telemetry that is received from the sensors. Insurance providers need to know which MSN
has been deployed with what sensor types and what billable actions have been taken with
the system. Researchers need a variety of information collected to be able to conduct
research and increase knowledge and positive outcomes of clinical care. Public health
organizations may need information collected to understand if there is a public health issue
in an area. The part of the requirements this thesis is concerned with are the regulations
that most countries have in their legislation relating to how the information can be
transmitted to ensure that there is limited opportunity for eavesdropping or modification of
the information.
2.1.1 Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA)
The United States passed legislation dealing with patient information that requires the
establishment of national standards for electronic health care transactions and national
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identifiers for providers, health insurance plans, and employers. HIPAA [1] required the
Secretary of the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) to develop
regulations protecting the privacy and security of certain health information. There are two
rules that are the foundation of the legislation, the Privacy Rule and the Security Rule. The
Privacy Rule provides federal protections for personal health information held by covered
entities and gives patients an array of rights with respect to that information while still
permitting the disclosure of personal health information needed for patient care and other
important purposes.
The patient has rights related to the health information collected and can request to
see a copy of the health records. Patients can have corrections added to their health
information, receive a notice that tells them how their information is used and shared,
decide whether to give permission before information can be used or shared for certain
purposes and get a report on when and why the health information was shared. The entities
covered under the law must teach the people who work for them how patient information
may or may not be used and shared and they must take appropriate and reasonable steps to
keep your health information secure.
The Security Rule establishes national standards for protecting the integrity,
confidentiality and availability of electronic protected health information (e-PHI). The
requirements state that entities must ensure the confidentiality, integrity and availability of
all e-PHI they create, receive, maintain, or transmit. They must identify and protect against
reasonably anticipated threats to the security or integrity of the information. They must
protect against reasonably anticipated, impermissible uses or disclosures. They must also
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ensure compliance by their workforce. The technical safeguards that are required are
Access Control, Audit Controls, Integrity Controls and Transmission Security.
2.1.2 Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act (PIPEDA)
and Other Relevant Laws
Canada passed legislation that governs how organizations collect, use and disclose
personal information in the course of business. Unlike the American legislation, PIPEDA
[2] applies to all organizations that have access to personal information for commercial
purposes. This requirement makes hospitals exempt from many of the regulations but
physicians’ commercial activities and private practice is covered under the law. Private
group homes are also covered under PIPEDA and need to meet the requirements. There
are laws that apply to hospitals and other primary care facilities on a provincial basis such
as the Personal Health Information Protection Act (PHIPA) [3] and the Freedom of
Information and Protection of Privacy Act (FIPPA) [4] in Ontario. PIPEDA requires that
all organizations receive consent for collection of information, except in a few specific
limited circumstances. The information can only be used or disclosed for the purposes for
which consent has been given. Even with consent, the collection, use and disclosure must
be limited to purposes that a reasonable person would consider appropriate under the
circumstances. The law also requires that individuals have a right to see the personal
information and the ability to correct any inaccuracies. The acts that relate to hospitals in
the different provinces have many of the same requirements as stated in PIPEDA.
PIPEDA and the other laws generally require that safeguards be put in place to
protect personal information against loss, or theft. The information must be protected from
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any unauthorized access, disclosure, copying, use or modification. The information must
be protected regardless of the format in which it is held.
2.2 Medical Wireless Sensor Networks (MWSN)
Wireless Sensor Networks will have a very large impact on many aspects of society
from military applications to common household appliances. The application of WSN to
the field of medicine will have widespread consequences in the gathering of medical
information and giving a more robust picture of patient health. Sensor networks can give
real-time information and telemetry to the clinicians that require the information to
properly respond to medical situations and emergencies. A MWSN can track many
different aspects of the patient including movement inside their home, their temperature
and other bio-medical information such as oxygen saturation. The telemetry will help
reduce costs for healthcare facilities by allowing patients to be remotely monitored instead
of being in a facility for observation. There are a few different frameworks based on the
Telos Mote[5] and Mica[6] Sensors. These frameworks generally use TinyOS [7] to
efficiently manage and utilize their resources with many different deployment strategies to
meet the differing needs of modern healthcare. Along with sensor information, there is a
very real possibility of medication being delivered in minute doses to patients based on
information gathered from medical sensor networks. The delivery of the medication would
be controlled by wireless communication. When the information gathered from an MWSN
reaches this level of integration with the medical care of patients, it is imperative that all
communication be very secure with high integrity and availability so that no mistakes can
occur and to be certain that the medication needed is the medication delivered to the patient
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when needed. The types of sensor networks gathering the medical telemetry that can be
used in the healthcare problem space are body sensor networks that are affixed to the
patient or implanted inside the body and environmental sensor networks that gather
information from the environment and are not physically connected to the patient and are
usually stationary. We describe both types of sensor networks in the next two sections.
2.2.1 Body Sensor Networks
The sensors are applied directly to the body and monitor patient vital signs. The
sensors will gather the information from the body and send it to clinicians for
understanding and monitoring. The CodeBlue framework presented by V. Shnayder, et al.
[8] shows a decentralized integrated MWSN for use in a clinical setting that will allow
clinicians to query patient sensors to send vital information. The telemetry devices they
use to collect data include a pulse oximeter, two-lead electrocardiogram, and a specialized
motion-analysis sensor. They have built routing protocols to allow a clinician device to be
able to query and receive data from these sensors while at a remote location in the medical
facility. The CodeBlue framework lacks security and data protection. B.Sarikaya, et al. [9]
integrate electroencephalography (EEG) sensors into the CodeBlue framework.
There are other frameworks that have encryption and integrity but lack authentication
or key agreement such as Kumar, et al. [10] who have built a sensor system for monitoring
patients; their example monitors Electrocardiograph (ECG) information. To ensure
confidentiality of the data, they have used the Ping-Pong [11] encryption algorithm with
the Ping-Pong MAC to ensure integrity. They proceed to develop a framework in [12]
based on the original paper where they describe an application that allows the sensor
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information to be presented to clinicians in a human usable format. Waluyo, et al. [13]
have developed a centralized framework that has a personal digital assistant (PDA) or other
powerful computing device as a sensor gateway. They have built the functionality for data
collection as well as command and control within their network which is built on TinyOS
on the sensors with a Java framework on the PDA. They have applied the SkipJack [14]
encryption algorithm to their communication to ensure confidentiality. There is no method
of Authentication and Key Agreement (AKA) as they have a single pre-distributed key for
all devices.
A home network for health monitoring is proposed by Singh, et al. [15] which relies
on stationary cameras, a PDA, body sensors, and home health controller system. This will
then send the clinical information over the internet to a medical center. They use an
Encrypted Key Exchange (EKE) [16] protocol for key distribution as well as a Key
Distribution Center (KDC) to limit the impact of losing the PDA as a core device in the
network. When establishing keys between body sensors the EKE uses user secure
environmental values (SEV) such as Inter-Pulse-Interval (IPI) or Heart Rate Variance
(HRV). Diffie-Hellman based EKE (DH-EKE) described in their work is used to establish
a session key, SEV is used as the Encryption in EKE. They show how this uses fewer
resources than Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC). PDA authentication uses KDC with a
multiple server protocol (each of the cameras). The user enters a password into the PDA.
This password is used as the encryption in the DH-EKE to authenticate the PDA against the
cameras. All of the cameras then authenticate against the PDA sending secure information
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allowing the PDA to authenticate the body sensor. As long as a minimum number of
cameras return the proper values then the PDA is authenticated against the body sensor.
2.2.2 Environmental Sensor Networks
Environmental sensors are placed within an environment to track information on the
patient and the environment which gives a holistic view of all conditions that the patient
may experience. An example is the stationary cameras previously mentioned in a home
network for health monitoring proposed by Singh, et al. [15]. Some sensors already exist
in the home such as carbon dioxide and carbon monoxide sensors. Sensors can be added to
the bed to monitor movement of bedridden patients to give information that would help
clinicians reduce the occurrence of bedsores. Infrared and other types of sensors can be
used in the environment to monitor patient bio-metric data without needing physical
contact with the patient.
2.3 Authentication in Sensor Networks
Authentication schemes in sensor networks always need to consider the limited
resources of the nodes that will need to authenticate themselves against the system. Sensor
nodes have limited power, limited processing, and limited memory. When considering any
protocols within this framework it is essential to reduce the overhead and processing to
increase the life of the sensor while ensuring security. There are many different methods
used to achieve secure authentication and key agreement. Symmetric key cryptography or
the more resource intensive asymmetric-key cryptography such as ECC, and RSA can all
be used to authenticate to a network. Authentication is an important aspect of MWSNs due
to the need for a patient to get their data to the clinicians handling their care. Mutual
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Authentication allows the patient to be certain that the network they connect to is the
appropriate network and it allows the clinical systems/clinician to be certain of which
patient is connecting to their system. Mutual authentication is also a very important factor
in billing for medical services rendered by the sensor network (eg. monitoring,
medications).
Collaborative Bloom Filters are used by B. Tong, et al. [17] to achieve authentication
for devices that wish to connect to the sensor network in conjunction with a Merkle hash
tree and ECC. When a node is added to the network it presents and authenticates itself to
the other 1-hop nodes in the sensor network giving each of those nodes a share of its
private key. If the node misbehaves then the 1-hop nodes can collaboratively use the
information to discern the private key of the misbehaving node to add to the revocation list.
M. Kim, et al. [18] present an adaptive mechanism that first relies on symmetric key
authentication that as the node behaves properly it will eventually gain enough information
to use a public key for authentication. This method relies on a shared common symmetric
key for all nodes and it may be possible to discern the private key of the node if other nodes
are compromised.
ECC is used as one of the two factors of authentication in Malasri, et al. [19]. The
second tier of authentication is by using biometric data such as a fingerprint reader or a
finger vein reader. The two factors allow for a more secure system compared to a single
factor of authentication. They also propose that the data collected by the sensor be checked
against the previous data as a method of ensuring the patient is the appropriate patient. If
the data collected does not correspond to the patient then an alert will be raised. The issue
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with this method of biometric authentication is that some patients will not present
themselves at the healthcare facility in a desired biometric state required for the
initialization of the biometric data. This will result in either alerts happening when the
patient is no longer experiencing the undesired biometric state or with no alert going off
when they are experiencing an undesired state.
Ren, et al. [20] use Public Key Cryptography (PKC) as they state that it is no longer
impractical for WSNs. Broadcast authentication is used in their WSNs under the multiuser
scenario by designing PKC based solutions with minimized computational and
communication costs. Their approach allows for the following security actions - user
authentication (illegitimate users will be excluded from injecting bogus messages), user
revocation (sensor nodes can deal with user revocations), and authenticity of any message
broadcast by a user should be able to be verified by every receiving node.
2.3.1 Authentication of Sensor Nodes
The sensor nodes will authenticate against each other or to a sink node. Sensor nodes
generally have the least resources of any device in the network. In many different sensor
networks the nodes will perform authentication against each other and to the network. The
nodes will also try to detect attacks on the system when routing information through other
nodes to a sink node for collection and possible transmission to the desired recipients.
Most sensor networks have many nodes all of the same type to achieve the desired task
such as intrusion detection into an area for military purposes. In a MWSN most of the
sensors are specialized to be able to collect the appropriate information from the patient.
2.3.2 Authentication of Sink Nodes
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These types of nodes are generally more powerful, can be a laptop or PDA, with
greater resources and communicate the sensor information back to a more central system.
The authentication of sensor nodes to the sink node will usually be less powerful than the
authentication of the sink to the central system.
2.4 Key Agreement in Sensor Networks
Key agreement is required in a secure network to allow devices to begin to
communicate securely and with integrity. Du, et al. [21] describe a methodology for an
asymmetric pre-distribution key management scheme in a Heterogeneous sensor network.
Their design has pre-distributed key pools to the sensors that allows for high probability of
key agreement between sensor nodes. The nodes can therefore authenticate against each
other by use of the pre-distributed keys. Camtepe, et al. [22] also propose a probabilistic
key distribution methodology to increase the likely-hood that two sensors will be able to
authenticate each other and proceed to communicate securely.
The proposed security framework for wireless medical sensor networks in Morchon,
et al. [23] relies on cryptographic keying material, a lightweight digital certificate linked to
the keying material and a security policy. This system is used to enable distributed key
agreement by means of the multidimensional secure key establishment scheme and
cryptographically enforced access control. Each node has keying material related to the
main security domain as well as other keying material related to each of the sub-domains to
which it has access. The design allows for quick and easy agreement between the medical
devices such as a PDA and the sensors on the type of access allowed by matching the
keying material.
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2.5 Encryption and Integrity in Sensor Networks
The limited resources in sensor networks require the design of the security to be
limited. To achieve confidentiality, Malasri, et al. [19] use the RC5 [24] encryption
algorithm and to achieve integrity in their communication they use the SHA-1 [25]
algorithm. Waluyo, et al. [13] use the SkipJack encryption algorithm to secure the
information sent in their framework from passive eavesdropping. They do not have any
integrity algorithms to ensure the quality of the communication and they do not have any
protections against active attacks. The single key used on all devices will allow one
compromised device to have full access to all information on their MWSN. The Ping-Pong
and Ping-Pong-MAC algorithms used by Kumar, et al. [10] meet both of these
requirements of confidentiality and integrity allowing the sensor to use similar algorithms
to reduce the overhead in both of these operations. There are many tools used in security to
achieve these goals such as stream ciphers, block ciphers and cryptographic hash functions.
Due to the limited resources available to sensor nodes it may be appropriate to use
stream ciphers to secure the communication between nodes since they generally use less
overhead and can easily be implemented in hardware. Ping-Pong, RC4, A5/1 and A5/2 are
stream ciphers that are used to protect communication. RC4 is the algorithm used in WEP
and it is also in active use by many websites such as Gmail, Amazon, and RBC. A5/1 and
A5/2 are encryption algorithms used in GSM communication but these algorithms have
serious flaws.
Block Ciphers generally require more resources than stream ciphers but there are
many advantages of using block ciphers. Block ciphers are the most active area of
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symmetric encryption research and they provide many different modes of securing the
information that have been accepted by the National Institute of Standards and Technology
[26]. One mode of operation is Cipher Block Chaining (CBC) which reduces the chance of
using a dictionary attack on the cipher text as each input block is XORed against the
previous block of cipher text. Other modes of operation that are very useful and allow the
block cipher to act as a stream cipher are Cipher Feedback (CFB), Output Feedback (OFB)
and Counter (CTR). Counter mode has the added advantage of being able to be decrypted
in parallel. Due to the increased complexity of block ciphers most cannot be easily
implemented in hardware but the AES block cipher is able to be implemented in hardware.
Hash functions have many applications in security and allow for simple methods of
ensuring integrity. Cryptographic hash functions take an input message and create a
pseudorandom output message digest that is easy to compute given the message but it is
infeasible to generate a message given the hash digest. It is also infeasible to modify a
message without changing the hash or to find two different messages with the same hash.
These properties make hashing a useful tool for integrity and for deriving pseudorandom
keys.
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Chapter 3
WIRELESS AUTHENTICATION AND
KEY AGREEMENT
Wireless communications have revolutionized the way the world communicates. An
important process used to secure that communication is authentication. Authentication is
the process of determining whether someone or something is, in fact, who or what it is
declared to be. The traditional method of authentication in computing is the challenge-
response mechanism. There is a shared secret between the two parties that is used in an
algorithm so that one party asks a question as a challenge and the other party must reply
with a correct answer as a response. For any wireless communication to be secure there
needs to be some type of authentication and key exchange to create that security. As flaws
in the security of a wireless network are discovered new protocols and algorithms are
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required to meet those security issues. When creating new algorithms and systems it is
possible that the existing equipment may not be able to implement the new protocols,
which means that integration may be required to transition from the old security protocols
to the new more secure protocols.
Using a wireless medium for communication means that any attacker has full access
to everything sent over the air and can use that information to attack, modify, and
eavesdrop or any other activity if the information is not properly secured. Stationary
wireless networks were created without a strong need to integrate protocols and have
simply developed slightly more secure protocols to protect old equipment. New protocols
in stationary wireless networks are implemented without integration as a requirement.
Mobile network security is constantly evolving and adapting to meet the needs of
users and network operators. Mobile wireless networks have the requirement of allowing
old equipment to use the entire network, as it is advantageous to allow new mobile
equipment to connect to old networking equipment to increase coverage areas and for old
equipment to be able to connect to new towers for roaming and billing. This requirement
for mobile networks means that integration is required. Mobile networks originally had no
security which proved to be a deployment nightmare that was attacked constantly and the
providers were defrauded of millions of dollars. To address the security issues in mobile
networks, the subscriber identity module (SIM) authentication protocols [27] were
developed to secure the resources of the network providers. The original SIM security
framework developed in Global System for Mobile Communications (GSM) networks had
weaknesses brought about by the one way authentication protocol as well as weaknesses in
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the algorithms used to secure the communication. The evolution of authentication in
mobile networks to address the problems in the SIM framework brought about the creation
of the universal subscriber identity module (USIM) protocols which are used in Universal
Mobile Telecommunications System (UMTS), Long Term Evolution (LTE) and
Worldwide Interoperability for Microwave Access (WiMAX) to secure the network from
the SIM framework security issues. The integration of those two SIM and USIM
frameworks brought forward the major weaknesses first found in the SIM framework.
This chapter discusses authentication in mobile wireless networks as well as the
needs of those networks to interoperate and the security issues brought about by that
integration. This will include a description of the authentication and key agreement (AKA)
protocols of the legacy SIM based 2G GSM networks, and the modern USIM based 3G
UMTS networks, 4G LTE networks and WiMAX networks. The authentication protocols
in the new generations of mobile wireless networks are designed to interoperate (not
replace) the existing protocols as the infrastructure for the existing system is deployed
nationally and is very expensive to replace requiring time, effort and expense. Therefore
the integration of the different protocols to allow this interoperation gives the mobile
operators the ability to upgrade their networks while still maintaining coverage for their
customers. The protocols and methods used for the integration of the legacy systems into
the modern AKA systems will be discussed. We explore simple and effective solutions to
reduce the possible attacks on the USIM protocols due to the above integration. First we
propose a subtle modification to the SIM based GSM security protocols as a stand-alone
solution, and then a modification to the USIM based UMTS security protocols is proposed
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as a second solution. When considering authentication in an M-WSN we need to
investigate the common methods of wireless authentication that have already been
deployed and therefore have undergone a large amount of scrutiny and have been able to
withstand many different vectors of attack.
It is worth mentioning that the integration of the old (flawed) security protocols is not
always the right option. For instance, the new authentication protocol described by IEEE
802.11i to protect stationary wireless networks replaced (did not interoperate with) the
legacy Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP) due to the problems found in the earlier
algorithms and protocols. Southern, et al. [28] compared the differences between the
interoperation solution in mobile networks and the replacement solution employed in
stationary wireless networks.
3.1 Evolution in Wireless Communications
Wireless communication allows for easy connectivity of devices without the
expensive requirements of laying a physical network. One of the main difficulties in
deploying wireless networks is the ability to secure information and resources on a medium
that by its very nature broadcasts all information. A key aspect of securing wireless
communication is the authentication protocol used to allow access to the network. The two
major types of wireless networks are the stationary networks generally defined by the IEEE
802.11 standards and the mobile networks defined as 2G, 3G and 4G networks. As
security requirements have changed, the protocols for authentication have adapted with
those changes. Both of these network types have faced significant security problems that
have needed to be addressed with stronger protocols and more secure cryptographic
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algorithms. When creating the new more powerful algorithms and protocols the older
hardware cannot implement them due to the more strenuous requirements.
The demands on mobile communication and networks have been constantly
increasing. Originally the need was simply to have a phone system that could meet most of
the requirements of the standard plain old telephone service (POTS) in most homes. The
original first generation (1G) systems, such as the advanced mobile phone system (AMPS),
were analog cellular networks which met this need without considering the inherent issues
that arise due to using a wireless medium as opposed to a wired one. Security was a major
issue that was not properly addressed when developing the 1G systems and therefore the
phones were susceptible to cloning. This was due to the phones broadcasting their identities
without encryption or integrity when phone calls are placed. Attackers could then take this
information and apply it to their own phone to then use it to connect to the provider
network allowing them to call anywhere without having a legitimate account with the
provider. The cloning defrauded many providers of large amounts of money while
inappropriately making unauthorized use of their resources. Securing resources against
inappropriate use is one of the many benefits and requirements of security in mobile
wireless communication.
The second generation of mobile communications (2G) strove to solve the phone
cloning issue and while meeting the expanding requirements of consumers with GSM/2G
networks. GSM networks also addressed some of the issues with using a wireless medium
when sending information. The new network authenticates the user against the network in a
cryptographically secure method to limit the potential of phone cloning security issues as
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well as ensuring that the network resources are not accessed inappropriately. This made
phone cloning a much more difficult proposition for attackers to inappropriately make use
of provider networks, while allowing providers to be much more certain that their resources
were not being fraudulently used by unauthorized devices. The problem with GSM
networks was that they did not appropriately protect the user from many other types of
attacks, such as the false base station attack that would allow an attacker to listen in or
modify the communication from the GSM user. The false base station attack and other
security issues in GSM networks were attempted to be resolved by providers with the third
generation of mobile communication (3G).
3G mobile communications allowed for much better use of the spectrum available
allowing much “smarter” devices to be on the network. Even though the cloning issue was
mostly resolved with the GSM networks there were other security issues that needed to be
addressed in universal mobile telecommunications systems (UMTS) networks. To address
these new issues the 3rd generation used mutual-authentication between the mobile device
and the provider network. The UMTS networks also have much higher speeds for IP
communication to allow for users to make extensive use of the network resources.
The next generation of mobile communication will make even further use of the
available spectrum and increase the ability of smart devices to do much more robust
communication with media and other applications. The authentication in the fourth
generation (4G) is still going to be the same authentication protocols as the USIM 3G to
make certain that resources are not misappropriated. 4G long term evolution (LTE)
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networks will allow wider bandwidths, higher efficiency and a fully IP network for all
communication.
GSM networks had by far the largest installed base of users with over 3 billion GSM
devices in use around the world [29]. This large market of devices has made it a business
requirement of all providers to allow for the legacy GSM system to be integrated into new
systems to ensure that these users can use the network resources and be billed appropriately
for that usage. The interoperation of legacy systems needs to be executed with the utmost
care to ensure that issues in the legacy system do not manifest themselves in the new
integrated system. There are many security concerns when integrating legacy systems and
the evolution of those systems to handle new requirements. The authentication done in the
GSM network was maintained in the new UMTS networks to allow these devices to
connect. This integration allows some of the security issues in GSM networks to be
exploited in the new network.
3.2 Authentication in Mobile Wireless Networks
When authenticating against a mobile wireless network the mobile equipment needs
to be able to send from one base station to another without a loss of communication or
interruption to an active connection. The requirement to roam without interruption forced
the development of a network that would allow a user to be able to authenticate to and use
all parts of the network seamlessly. A major difficulty faced by mobile networks is the
ability for a user to roam from one network operator to another network operator which
allows mobile network providers to bill foreign users and systems. This support limits the
control a network provider has over the hardware connecting to their network. These
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networks also tend to be built out nationally, a very large investment, which needs to be
leveraged as long as possible to have connectivity for all users. Some users are also likely
to keep a functioning phone for a much longer time than a functioning laptop. GSM
phones will operate as a worthwhile and functioning phone for more than a decade which
to many users that means there is no reason to upgrade their device.
3.2.1 SIM-based Authentication Mechanism
Mobile service providers needed to secure their networks from attack and
misappropriation of networking resources. In the attempt to achieve the goals set out in
GSM of protecting access to mobile services and to protect any relevant item from being
disclosed on the radio path [30], the GSM security protocols were developed. There are
many technical constraints that needed to be addressed when adding security to mobile
communication. When authenticating against a mobile wireless network the mobile
equipment needs to be able to send from one base station to another without a loss of
communication or interruption to an active connection. The requirement to roam without
interruption was a major factor in development of mobile networks that would allow a user
to be able to authenticate to and use all parts of the network seamlessly. The authentication
protocol deployed to address these problem was the SIM based GSM protocol.
The authentication in GSM is a one-way authentication algorithm to authenticate the
mobile device to the service provider network. As shown in Figure 3.1 the algorithm uses
a secret key K that is shared between the GSM home network and the mobile device. The
mobile device identifies itself to the network by sending its international mobile subscriber
identity (IMSI) to the base station (BS). The BS forwards the IMSI to the home network of
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the device. Based on the IMSI the home network recognizes the corresponding key K that
is used along with a random challenge (RAND) to generate a session key Kc =A8(RAND,
K) and the expected response to the challenge SRES=A3(RAND, K), where A8 and A3 are
two hashing functions. The home network sends the authentication vector (RAND, SRES,
Kc) to the BS who will retain SRES and Kc and sends the RAND to the mobile device as a
challenge. Using the shared secret key K along with the received RAND the mobile
generates the response SRES' and generates the same session key Kc. The mobile device
responds to the BS with the SRES which the BS then matches against the SRES to verify
the identity of the mobile device. This authentication in GSM gave the service providers
the ability to address the issue of cell phone cloning by issuing a challenge to the device
that would appropriately be responded to with the SRES'. GSM also added encryption
using the key Kc to the channel to allow the confidentiality on the information transmitted
across the air interface.
Figure 3.1: GSM Authentication Protocol.
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Even with all of these new security enhancements to wireless communication, there
are many problems with the authentication and security in GSM. The encryption and
hashing algorithms were developed in secret design, in violation of Kerckhoff’s principle
[31]. It says a cryptosystem should be secure even if everything about the system, except
the key, is public knowledge, which led to the system being less secure than if they had
used known algorithms that had been vetted by cryptographers not involved in the design.
In addition, the stream cipher A5 is used for encrypting the communication channels. The
adopted A5/1 encryption algorithm in GSM can be broken in real time [32] and the A5/2
algorithm is easily broken in seconds [33] meaning that the intent to keep communication
of the customer on the network private is no longer truly provided by the protocol. The
GSM framework does allow providers to choose different algorithms for both the hashing
and encryption but due to the established base and weaknesses in the protocol this is not
entirely feasible for the encryption protocol (hashing protocols can be set specifically for
each device at the discretion of the provider). The XRES and other values are also limited
by their length as required in the GSM protocol.
The authentication protocol has many flaws that allow for denial of service, and false
base station attacks since the subscriber does not authenticate the network. Note that, GSM
uses one-way authentication. A false base station attack is visible due to the mobile device
not authenticating the network. The false base station attack is a classic man-in-the-middle
attack that generally passes most of the communication from the handset to the tower but
will modify some of the transactions to attack the network. These attacks have a method
that can retrieve the IMSI of the device and they can have the false tower also force the
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device to not use encryption for communication which allows the attacker to listen to the
conversation and possibly inject information into the channel. Again, the fact that GSM
protocol authenticates only the phone and leaves the network unauthenticated allows for
these base station attacks to neutralize any increase in the quality of the encryption
algorithms since the devices will support the older implemented algorithms and no
encryption. The insecurity brought about by the protocol allows these attacks to
compromise the confidentiality and integrity of the user communication with the network.
3.2.2 USIM-based Authentication Mechanism
3.2.2.1 UMTS-AKA Authentication Protocol
UMTS networks have mutual authentication in which the mobile device is
authenticated to the network as well as the network authenticating the phone as shown in
Figure 3.2. This mutual authentication allows the device to discern whether or not the
network they are connecting to is a legitimate network. The authentication protocol also
makes use of integrity to ensure that the communication is not modified when selecting
algorithms for encryption and integrity. The authentication protocol follows many of the
same network steps in the GSM protocol with some important changes. The authentication
token AUTN as well as the integrity key (IK) are sent from the home network. The AUTN
token along with the RAND are then sent to the mobile device which processes the RAND
with the key to verify the AUTN token by validating the MAC section of the token sent
from the network against the XMAC created by using the key, sequence, authentication
management field (AMF), and RAND. Note that, AMF is a section of the AUTN token.
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The mobile equipment also does a validation of the sequence to ensure that it is within the
desired range. This verification allows the mobile device to trust the connection to the
network.
Figure 3.2: UMTS Authentication Protocol.
The algorithms are at the discretion of the providers but generally the Kasumi [34]
algorithm is used for both integrity and encryption with an option of no encryption. The
UMTS protocol does not allow the system to operate without integrity, which in
conjunction with the authentication allows the mobile device and network to have a
reasonable expectation that there has been no modification of the communication. This
method of authentication with integrity limits many attacks in a purely UMTS network.
The Kasumi algorithm is a modified MISTY1 algorithm that was chosen for its suitability
for implementation in hardware. The algorithm has some weaknesses but is not susceptible
to real-time attacks [35]. Currently the ITU (International Telecommunication Union) is
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still developing the standards for 4G mobile communications but the authentication
protocols are the same as those of the UMTS network [36].
3.2.2.2 EPS AKA, LTE Authentication Protocol
LTE networks were developed to meet the growing mobile data usage of users. The
new network moved voice off of a circuit switched network to a packet switched IP based
VoIP protocol. There is better utilization of the bandwidth and increased speed and
capacity available for providers to meet the constantly growing needs of their users.
LTE networks have expanded the authentication key agreement used in UMTS. The
beginning of the protocol is identical with the IMSI request being forwarded by the base
station to the authentication center (AuC) as can be seen in Figure 3.3. The changes begin
with the evolved packet system (EPS) authentication vector (AV) which has RAND,
AUTN, XRES, and KASME which is the access security management entity (ASME) instead
of CK and IK. The CK and IK values in the USIM along with the serving network’s
identity are the input into a key derivation function (KDF) to generate KASME. Then the
similarities to the UMTS protocol continue with the user equipment (UE) validating the
MAC and then responding with the RES for the network to complete the authentication
procedure by comparing it with XRES. The major change in EPS is that the KASME is used
to generate keys in a key hierarchy. Keys are generated for three different traffic types: the
non-access stratum (NAS), access stratum (AS) and radio resource control (RRC).
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Figure 3.3: EPS-AKA Authentication.
The Key Agreement within the EPS-AKA protocol allows for 6 different keys to be
generated as shown in Figure 3.4 which shows the different equipment that will be used to
derive each key, as follows.
 K is a 128-bit secret key stored permanently in USIM and AuC.
 CK and IK are a pair of 128-bit keys derived in AuC and USIM during the
AKA process.
 KASME is a 256-bit intermediate key derived in the home subscriber server
(HSS) and UE from CK and IK, during the AKA process. KASME is then
forwarded to MME as a part in the EPS AV along with RAND, XRES and
AUTN.
 KeNB, KNASint, KNASenc, are 256-bit Intermediate Keys derived in MME and UE
as well from KASME when UE transits to EPS Connection Management ECM
state or by UE and target base station eNodeB (eNB) using the previous KeNB
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during eNB handover. KeNB is then forwarded to the eNB. KNASint is an
integrity key for protection of NAS data derived in MME and UE. KNASenc is
an encryption key for protection of NAS data derived in MME and UE.
 KUPenc, KRRCint and KRRCenc are 256-bit keys derived from KeNB in eNB and
UE. KUPenc is an encryption key for protection of user data derived in eNB and
UE. KRRCint is an integrity key for protection of user data derived in eNB and
UE. KRRCenc is also an encryption key for protection of RRC data derived in
eNB and UE.
Therefore, these keys are all based off of the pre-shared key K. They follow the same
processes in UMTS as is evident in Figure 3.3 which are used to generate the different keys
and values required for the key agreement and authentication. The difference arises when
the keys CK and IK as well as the serving network identity (SNid) are used as input into a
key derivation function KDF generating KASME which is then used to generate all the other
keys.
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Figure 3.4: EPS-AKA Key Derivation.
The authentication and key agreement in EPS-AKA has identical steps for mutual
authentication as UMTS only the key agreement and which devices perform the key
generation steps differ.
3.2.2.3 EPS AKA, LTE Authentication Protocol
Worldwide Interoperability for Microwave Access (WiMAX) is an IP based, wireless
broadband access technology that provides performance similar to 802.11/Wi-Fi networks
with the coverage and quality of service (QOS) of cellular networks. In a fixed wireless
configuration it can replace the telephone company's copper wire networks, the cable TV's
coaxial cable infrastructure while offering Internet service provider (ISP) services. In its
mobile variant, WiMAX has the potential to replace cellular networks. It is an IEEE
standard designated 802.16-2004 (fixed wireless applications) and 802.16e-2005 (mobile
wire-less).
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Figure 3.5: EAP-AKA Authentication.
To allow connections to WiMAX by current USIM cellular devices an extensible
authentication protocol method for UMTS Authentication and Key Agreement or for short
EAP-AKA was developed to integrate the UMTS-AKA algorithm into the extensible
authentication protocol (EAP) framework as seen in Figure 3.5. The start of the protocol
requires the UE to initiate the connection with the access point (AP) by sending an
EAPOL-Start message. The AP will then respond with the EAPOL-request/identity
message. The remainder of the protocol is very similar to the UMTS-AKA algorithm but
with the elements wrapped in their equivalent EAP message types. Therefore the UE will
respond to the EAPOL-request/identity message with an EAPOL-response/identity which
contains the IMSI of the USIM. The IMSI will be sent from the AP to the home
authentication, authorization and accounting server (HAAA) which will control all future
communication with the UE through the AP. The HAAA will then forward the IMSI to the
AuC which will then create the authentication vector, identical to the one created in UMTS.
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The AuC will send the authentication vector of CK, IK, RAND, XRES, and AUTN to the
HAAA. The HAAA will then send an EAP-request/AKA-challenge containing the RAND,
AUTN, and MAC to the UE. The UE will verify the MAC and respond to the HAAA with
the RES in an EAP-response/AKA-challenge message which is then to be validated by the
HAAA. The HAAA will then respond with an EAP-success message.
The EAP framework adds some extra overhead to the UMTS-AKA protocol with the
addition of the EAP standard messages that complete the requirements of the EAP
framework but the overall protocol uses the same messages and mutual authentication
requirements.
3.3 Authentication in Stationary Wireless Networks
To understand the security environment in mobile wireless networks it is worthwhile
to review the security in stationary networks since both types of networks have undergone
a phase of broken security and a migration of equipment from the less secure to more
secure environments. Stationary wireless networks allow user equipment to connect to a
network without the need of a physical wire. This allows for more user mobility and to
create a network quickly and in environments where it is difficult or expensive to deploy
physical networks. Generally, there is no need in these types of networks to manage the
mobility of the user from one network access point to another as the connection does not
need to be maintained if a user roams from one network area to another. The main
difference for stationary networks is that the wireless users generally have modern or more
powerful equipment that connects to the network and the network operator will generally
have more control over all devices on the network. Stationary network providers did not
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have the same need to make their network allow access to old devices. Another major
consideration in the evolution of security in stationary networks is that the equipment
manufacturers were in control of the development and migration of the security framework
and therefore did not have a strong vested interest in maintaining older hardware and would
prefer to sell the new hardware that meets the new standard.
3.3.1 Wired Equivalent Privacy
The first type of security devised for wireless communication in the 802.11 standard
is WEP. The algorithm relies on a shared Key (WEP key) of 40 bits or 104 bits as well as
an Initialization Vector (IV) of 24 bits. As can be seen in Figure 3.6, WEP authentication
process starts when a user equipment UE requests to associate with the access point AP,
where UE must authenticate itself to the AP. Based on this request, AP sends a challenge
nonce R (random number) to the UE, and waits for the response. The UE then encrypts the
challenge R using a stream symmetric cipher RC4 as follows.
 The challenge R is first checksummed using CRC32 that is added to R to
form the data payload.
 Then the UE creates a 24-bit random initialization vector (IV).
 The IV and the WEP key are used as a seed to generate RC4 key stream K.
 The ciphertext is produced by XORing the key stream K with the data
payload.
UE then transmits the ciphertext and the IV to the AP as its response. The AP uses
the IV that it received and the shared WEP key to decrypt the data and verify the
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checksum. If a match is found, the authentication declared successful and the association is
formed.
Figure 3.6: WEP Authentication Protocol.
Note that the cryptosystem used in WEP is a stream symmetric cipher RC4, and the
key that encrypts the data is the same key that will be used for decryption to recover the
data.
Scott Fluhrer, et al. [37] describe in their work titled "Weaknesses in the Key
Scheduling Algorithm of RC4”, a number of weakness in the WEP protocol. The flaws are
related the way RC4 was implemented. They have mentioned that WEP can be cracked if
enough traffic can be intercepted. This is because there are only 16 million possible IV’s
(24-bit), so after intercepting enough packets, there are sure to be repeats in the IV’s. When
IVs repeat, the RC4 key stream can be easily discovered and hence a known-plaintext
attack can be utilized to recover the plaintext without the need for the WEP key. The end
result is that WEP has suffered from key management problems, implementation errors,
and overall weakness in the encryption mechanism.
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3.3.2 Wi-Fi Protected Access (WPA)
The major flaws in WEP made it necessary for the Wi-Fi Alliance to create a stronger
protocol to increase the security of wireless networks without replacing the legacy
hardware. There was a rush to create a more secure wireless network and therefore WPA
was developed as a pre-standard 802.11i protocol that would be able to be loaded as an
update to most WEP firmware and would improve the security of existing wireless
networks until the 802.11i protocol could be ratified. WPA has the endorsement of the
Temporal Key Integrity Protocol (TKIP) and Message Integrity Check (MIC) by the Wi-Fi
Alliance. Authentication under WPA is completely different than that in WEP as shown in
Figure 3.7.
Figure 3.7: WPA authentication against the access point.
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The AP sends a random A-nonce to the UE. The UE takes the Pairwise Master Key
(PMK), a pre-shared key given to the UE and AP, the received A-nonce, a generated S-
nonce, along with AP and UE MAC addresses to compute a Pairwise Transient Key (PTK).
This is done by using the Pseudo-Random Functions PRF-512. The PTK is then used to
create a Hash-based Message Authentication Code (HMAC) created by the Message-
Digest Algorithm (MD5) by giving the Key confirmation key (KCK) which is the first 128
bits of the PTK and the S-nonce as the input into the HMAC-MD5 algorithm. The S-nonce
and produced MIC are then sent to the AP. The AP can perform the same PRF-512 done
by the user equipment to generate the PTK and then use the PTK to verify the MIC. Once
verified the AP will send an encapsulated Group Temporal Key (GTK) and MIC back to
the UE for verification. The UE will then respond with an Acknowledgement of successful
authentication. The PTK is also used to generate the Key Encryption Key (KEK) and the
Temporal Key (TK). The KEK is used to encapsulate the GTK and other handshaking
encryption and the TK is used for encrypting the communication over the link. The
encryption in TKIP is done using RC4 similar to the encryption in WEP. The methodology
used for the encryption of packets in TKIP greatly increases the security compared to WEP
as the TK is constantly updated by the larger IV.
3.3.3 Wi-Fi Protected Access 2 (WPA2)
The Wi-Fi Alliance completed 802.11i as WPA2 to secure communication on
wireless networks due to the weaknesses of WEP and WPA. The protocol relies on a
shared key called the same Pairwise Master Key (PMK) generated in WPA which is
designed to last the entire session and is exposed as little as possible. WPA2 uses the same
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four-way handshake to authenticate the user equipment (UE) to the access point (AP) and
create keys for communication which can be seen in Figure 3.7. Similar to WPA using
TKIP, WPA2 uses counter mode (CTR) with cipher-block chaining message authentication
code (CBC-MAC) Protocol (CCMP) to perform many operations including securing the
communication channel. There are some differences in the authentication between WPA
and WPA2 such as the PRF used to generate the PTK in WPA2 is 384 bits. The MIC in
the authentication is SHA-1. The encryption in CCMP uses the advanced encryption
standard (AES). There are major differences in the way the encryption is completed in
CCMP compared to TKIP but those differences are not being investigated in this paper as
we are focusing on authentication. The change to using the more secure SHA-1 for the
MIC instead of MD5 creates a much more secure authentication.
The migration from WEP/WPA to WPA2 could be accomplished relatively quickly
due to the fact that most mobile equipment (laptops and other powerful equipment) is
upgraded frequently and has very few requirements to run on minimal resources. The
migration of the network from WEP/WPA to WPA2 is handled by the network provider
which was only limited by each organization mandate and could be accomplished when
needed. Overall the cost of the upgrade has involved a massive replacement of equipment
on a very large worldwide scale. The capacity of network devices has also grown with the
migration from 802.11a to b to g to n, therefore, most providers would have upgraded their
networks with the new technology and most users would upgrade their devices at the same
time as well to make use of new computing power. The mobile networks have very
different considerations when upgrading or integrating protocols. Mobile network
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operators have agreements with many other operators to allow almost any devices onto
their network. To facilitate this requirement the network needs to operate in both SIM and
USIM security contexts which we will show in the following section.
3.4 Legacy Integration of SIM with USIM
When the time came for industry to move to UMTS networks the market was already
saturated with a large number of GSM devices and network equipment. The integration
offered by the protocol allows for the providers to make use of the already embedded
systems. To make the transition cost effective and to make maximum use of the existing
user and network hardware, GSM backwards compatibility was built into the UMTS
protocols [38]. The interoperation between the two systems allows GSM devices on the
UMTS network and allows the network to be slowly upgraded to the new infrastructure. A
provider can then support the large number of devices owned by customers as well as have
a planned strategy for upgrading their network infrastructure.
To achieve the integration there are some equations that are used to convert the keys
from UMTS CK and IK to GSM Kc and vice versa. Those equations allow the mobile
device and network to continue to operate without requiring re-authentication to roam from
one network configuration to another. Those equations to create Kc are:
ܭ௖ = ܥܭଵ⨁ܥܭଶ⨁ܫܭଵ⨁ܫܭଶ (3.1)
ݓℎ ݁݁ݎ , ܥܭ = ܥܭଵ ∥ ܥܭଶ (3.2)
ܽ݊݀ ܫܭ = ܫܭଵ ∥ ܫܭଶ (3.3)
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To create CK and IK from Kc when moving from a GSM context to a UMTS context
the following equations are used:
ܥܭ = ܭ௖ ∥ ܭ௖ (3.4)
ܫܭ = ܭ௖ଵ⨁ܭ௖ଶ ∥ ܭ௖ ∥ ܭ௖ଵ⨁ܭ௖ଶ (3.5)
ݓℎ ݁݁ݎ , ܭ௖ = ܭ௖ଵ ∥ ܭ௖ଶ (3.6)
The following sub-section will be exploring 3 different authentication scenarios of
GSM and UMTS equipment to show the methods of integrating these two generations of
mobile communications.
The 3GPP attempted to address these issues with the security upgrades to the USIM
protocol in LTE. They do adequately address protecting the existing USIM keys when
moving to the less secure GSM or UMTS network configurations but there are possible
issues with security spoofing that may bring the GSM issues forward into the LTE
framework. When moving to the less secure UMTS network the proposed specification
[39] states that the key KASME will be used with the KDF to generate a CK’ and IK’ to be
used in the UMTS network. This will protect the LTE framework from an attacker gaining
information during the subsequent UMTS or GSM communication and trying to learn
information about KASME to attack the previous LTE communication.
The LTE specification also states that when moving into LTE from UMTS that a
check of CK should be done to see if the first 64 and last 64 bits match. If they do it can be
assumed that the connection was at one time a GSM connection. These are to be dropped
unless there is an ongoing emergency communication occurring. It may be possible to
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spoof this status of emergency communication as an attacker due to the fact that an attacker
could have full control of the communication from the UE. It also doesn’t seem entirely
practical to refuse the authentication transfer if an active non-emergency conversation is
occurring.
3.4.1 GSM Mobile Device with UMTS Network
When a GSM Mobile device is on a UMTS network as shown in Figure 3.8, and as
per the order of the circled numbers, GSM Mobile subscriber requests a secure connection
to UMTS BTS. The UMTS MSC requests from the GSM home network the authentication
vector (RAND,XRES, Kc). The UMTS MSC receives and then forwards the authentication
vector to the UMTS BTS. The UMTS BTS then perform the GSM Authentication protocol
with GSM Mobile subscriber as described in 2.3.1 and Figure 3.1 above. If the
authentication process succeeded, the GSM Mobile and the UMTS BTS can communicate
securely applying the UMTS encryption algorithms using the UMTS key CK and the
integrity key IK.
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Figure 3.8: The GSM Mobile subscriber is authenticated via a UMTS BTS, which is connected to a
UMTS MSC.
Note that, the system will create Kc at the home AuC of the GSM which will then be
expanded with Equations (3.4) and (3.5) to create CK and IK in an enhanced GSM mode to
increase the security of the communication. The issue brought about by this configuration
is that when Kc has already been discovered by an attacker when the phone is operating in a
fully GSM context the expanded CK and IK are easy to discern from the equations and all
of UMTS communication can be discovered by an attacker.
3.4.2 UMTS Mobile Device with GSM BTS
When connecting to the network it is possible for a UMTS mobile device to connect
to a GSM BTS. As shown in Figure 3.9, and as per the order of the circled numbers, the
UMTS Mobile subscriber requests a secure connection to GSM BTS. Accordingly, the
UMTS MSC requests from the UMTS home network the authentication vector
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(RAND,XRES, CK, IK, AUTN). The UMTS MSC receives the UMTS authentication
vector and proceeds to generate a GSM Kc using Equation (3.1) and then forwards it to the
GSM BTS. The GSM BTS performs the GSM authentication protocol with UMTS Mobile
subscriber as described in Section 3.2.1 and Figure 3.1 above. If this authentication process
succeeds, the UMTS Mobile and the GSM BTS communicate using the GSM encryption
algorithms using the GSM Kc.
Figure 3.9: The UMTS Mobile subscriber is authenticated via a GSM BTS, which is connected to a
UMTS MSC.
This type of connection is created either during authentication or during handover to
this type of network. The only network device that uses the GSM protocols in this type of
connection is the BTS. The MSC, Mobile and AUC are all UMTS devices. The MSC will
retain the CK and IK generated by the UMTS authentication but all encryption between the
Mobile and the GSM BTS is done using the Kc created using equation(3.1). Kc is created
by the Mobile and by the UMTS MSC and the GSM BTS is oblivious to this operation.
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The communication between the Mobile and the BTS can be considered as secure as that of
normal GSM communication. When moving to other network configurations the MSC will
use the CK and IK that were originally generated instead of using the Kc generated for the
BTS. We know that, the Kc can be compromised during communication with the BTS and
will therefore give 64 bits of information relating to the original CK and IK.
3.4.3 UMTS Mobile Device with GSM BTS and MSC
Figure 3.10 shows another scenario when a UMTS mobile device is connecting to a
GSM network. Following the order of the circled number in the Figure, the UMTS Mobile
subscriber requests a secure connection to GSM BTS. Accordingly, the GSM MSC
requests from the UMTS home network the authentication vector (RAND, XRES, Kc)
where it is generated using the UMTS authentication vector (RAND, XRES, CK, IK,
AUTN). The GSM MSC receives the GSM authentication vector and forwards Kc to the
GSM BTS. The GSM BTS then performs the GSM Authentication protocol with UMTS
Mobile subscriber as described in Section 3.2.2 and Figure 3.2 above. If this authentication
process succeeded the UMTS Mobile and the GSM BTS communicate using the GSM
encryption algorithms using the GSM Kc.
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Figure 3.10: The UMTS Mobile subscriber is authenticated via a GSM BTS, which is connected to a
GSM MSC.
In this type of connection authentication or handover occurs when a UMTS
authenticated session moves to a GSM network. The GSM MSC and GSM BTS can only
handle the Kc for GSM communication. Therefore the UMTS authenticated network
transfers Kc derived from equation (3.1) to the GSM MSC. The new Kc will be used to
create any future CK and IK as well as for all communication between the GSM BTS and
the Mobile using equations (3.4) and (3.5). This decreases the security of the system
beyond the 64 bits of knowledge shown in the previous weakness to a full break of all
future communication. All future communication until a new authentication request can be
discovered and modified by a false base station. This is the worst case scenario for a
UMTS device as it is fully compromised.
3.5 Proposed Solution to Problem of GSM Integration in UMTS
Chapter 3: Wireless Authentication and Key Agreement
48
To solve the issues brought about by integrating the large install-base of the GSM
platform and network equipment into the new and more secure UMTS system we have two
solutions. We cannot do large modifications to the existing GSM system to protect the
communication that will happen when in a GSM context and will therefore assume that
when communication happens in a GSM context that Kc will be compromised and known
to attackers. Our focus is on protecting the UMTS communication from attacks through
the integration with GSM. First we show a modification to GSM that will allow future
communication to be secure when on an UMTS network. Our second proposal is a larger
modification to the UMTS protocols to harden the communication in UMTS from attacks
due to the GSM integration. It is worth mentioning that, both of the proposals do nothing
to increase the security in GSM. GSM is still insecure but we are protecting UMTS from
the integration with GSM.
3.5.1 Proposed Modification to GSM
The change we are proposing to the GSM authentication protocol shown in Figure
3.11 is simple and yet very effective. As all GSM devices have a hashing algorithm
available, such as A3 and A8, and this operation need only happen once when moving from
tower to tower the overhead should be minimal. It may be simple to implement this change
to existing GSM system hardware. A hashing algorithm is able to keep the source material
unknown while creating the same output if given identical input.
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Figure 3.11: Proposed modification to GSM Protocol.
This is because it is computationally hard to discover the input if the output is known.
Therefore we propose that the encryption in GSM is done with a new key Kh which is a
hash of Kc instead of Kc directly, as it is shown in Equation (3.7).
ܭ௛ = ℎܽݏℎ(ܭ௖) (3.7)
This would leave the GSM communication open to all of the previous attacks but
when compromised would give the attacker access to Kh instead of Kc. We will now
describe how this change protects the communication in each of the previously described
scenarios.
Case 1: GSM Mobile Device with UMTS Network
Figure 3.11 shows how GSM authentication takes place with the proposed
modification, we see that the air-interface between the mobile subscriber and the BTS is
encrypted using shared key Kh. If we assumed an attacker has successfully compromised Kh
due to the insecurity of GSM, still the attacker has no access to the value of Kc. This means
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the values of CK and IK that are derived from Kc (see Equations (3.4) and (3.5)) are not
compromised. Therefore, in this scenario UMTS security is not be compromised and its
strength depends on the security of the cryptographic hash function used in Equation (3.7).
Case 2: UMTS Mobile Device with GSM BTS
When encrypting the communication again between the mobile and the GSM BTS
using the key Kh (see Figure 3.11), the value of Kc will be shielded by the cryptographic
hash function. This hash would keep the attacker far from deriving 64 bits of CK and IK
when the user moves to other networks as the attacker would not be able to discern
anything beyond Kh when the system is communicating in this scenario. Again, knowing
the value of Kh gives no significant knowledge of Kc and therefore no partial knowledge of
CK and IK.
Case 3: UMTS Mobile Device with GSM BTS and MSC
Similarly in this scenario, the cryptographic hash function protects Kc from the
attacker. This has a much larger implication in this scenario as the CK and IK that will be
used in the future are completely derived from Kc and will be protected from attack due to
the fact that the hash function is one-way function. Therefore, the compromised Kh will not
give the attacker significant knowledge of Kc and through that will protect all future
communication using CK and IK that are derived directly from Kc.
3.5.2 Proposed Modification to UMTS
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The change to the UMTS protocol is two-fold as it needs to protect information when
moving to a GSM network and protect the user when moving back to a UMTS network
context. First we recommend that instead of using the equations developed for integration
of the legacy GSM protocols we propose that a hash of CK and IK be used to create the key
Kc to be used when communicating in the GSM network. I.e., Equation (3.1) above will be
modified as follows:
ܭ௖ = ܥܪଵ⨁ܥܪଶ⨁ܫܪଵ⨁ܫܪଶ (3.8)
ݓℎ ݁݁ݎ , ℎܽݏℎ(ܥܭ) = ܥܪଵ ∥ ܥܪଶ (3.9)
ܽ݊݀ ℎܽݏℎ(ܫܭ) = ܫܪଵ ∥ ܫܪଶ (3.10)
The advantage to using this equation as opposed to Equation (3.1) is that the attacker
will be unable to find information relating to CK and IK by knowing the value of Kc. This
modification would protect the information sent before moving to the GSM context by
securing the values of CK and IK from creating the value of Kc.
Figure 3.12: Request/Response to retrieve new CK and IK.
The second change to the protocol is to have the UMTS mobile device and the
network do a simple hash of Kc, K and a RAND to create a new CK and IK for use after
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leaving the GSM context. This would be a simple request/response from the new UMTS
network to the UMTS AuC to create the new CK and IK to be used for communication
similar to a location update as can be seen in Figure 3.12. The small request would require
much less overhead than a full re-authentication in UMTS to limit resource utilization on
the network. The message sent would be similar to the location update by sending the
TMSI along with Kc to the UMTS AuC. The UMTS AuC would then perform a hashing
operation as to create a new set of keys for IK and CK that we will call KCK||IK shown as
follows:
ܭ஼௄||ூ௄ = ℎܽݏℎ(ܭ௖ ∥ ܭ ∥ ܴܣܰܦ) (3.11)
ݓℎ ݁݁ݎ , ܭ஼௄||ூ௄ = ܥܭ ∥ ܫܭ (3.12)
The AuC will proceed to respond with the new KCK||IK and a RAND to be sent to the
mobile device to perform the same operation. This would by necessity have to occur
before or immediately after handover to a fully UMTS context. The mobile device and the
UMTS network would then be able to communicate securely without considering the fact
that the Kc could have been compromised during the GSM communication context. The
next sections will describe the impact of this change on the different network scenarios.
Case 1: GSM Mobile Device with UMTS Network
This context would use the new KCK||IK created in Equation (3.11) for the keys CK
and IK to be used in the UMTS encrypted communication. This would make the
communication secure from any possible attack if the value of Kc had been discovered
previously during a fully GSM context. The new values of CK and IK are not derived with
Chapter 3: Wireless Authentication and Key Agreement
53
Equation (3.1) and therefore do not directly come from Kc which makes future
communication secure from a compromised GSM context.
Case 2: UMTS Mobile Device with GSM BTS
The communication in this context would be encrypted using a Kc derived from
Equation (3.8). The communication during this GSM based context would be
compromised but communication that occurred before this point would be secure due to the
hash in Equation (3.8) that creates the key Kc and communication after this context would
be secure due to the fact that Kc would have been created from a hash and therefore the
existing CK and IK can be used with confidence for future communications as no
information on the existing CK and IK has been discovered.
Case 3: UMTS Mobile Device with GSM BTS and MSC
In this context, once again the hash in Equation (3.8) protects CK and IK from the
attacker and therefore all previous communication is secure and no significant knowledge
of CK and IK is available to the attacker. Kc is still available to be compromised by an
attacker in this configuration and therefore, when moving to another context from this
context we will be creating a new CK and IK from Equation (3.11) that will make future
communication secure.
3.6 Summary
Wireless network communication requires that user equipment be able to securely
connect to the network and maintain integrity of that communication. In stationary
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networks there is no requirement for user equipment to be able to use all access points and
to communicate while roaming between access points. Mobile networks have a different
requirement that requires that user equipment be able to use all base stations and
communicate while roaming and therefore, legacy protocols needed to be integrated into
new network systems.
To help manage the transition from the legacy GSM system, protocols were devised
to integrate the billions of existing devices into the new UMTS network. The integration
protocols that allow for the integration of those legacy devices also inadvertently brought
the insecurity of the GSM system into the new much more secure UMTS system. The
GSM key Kc can be compromised and therefore, due to the method of integrating the two
systems together which uses simple Equations (3.1), (3.4) and (3.5) to create the keys CK,
IK and Kc used for encryption and integrity, an attacker that has discovered Kc can discern
either all or part of CK and IK. This integration has allowed previous attacks on the GSM
system to be effective against attacking the UMTS network negating the positive changes
brought about by the mutual authentication in UMTS.
We have proposed two different changes to the protocols in mobile networks to
protect against the legacy integration of GSM. One is a very simple change to the GSM
protocol to protect Kc by creating Kh a hash of Kc shown in Equation (3.7) which is to be
used when encrypting. This will protect Kc from attackers and therefore, protect the UMTS
communication that depends on the keys devised from Equations (3.1), (3.4) and (3.5). The
other change we propose is for the UMTS protocol to be modified to remove the Equations
(3.1), (3.4) and (3.5) used to generate CK, IK and Kc and replaces those equations with two
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Equations (3.8), and (3.11) which both use a hash function. We also create a simple
request/response protocol to generate a new CK, IK pair generated from Equation (3.11) to
be used in future communication. The changes we have proposed will help resolve the
insecurity brought about by the legacy integration of the GSM equipment and protocols
into the new UMTS system. This integration was required due to the large and growing
install-base of GSM devices.
Out of the two solutions proposed we recommend the solution of a GSM hash since it
changes the protocol that has introduced the problems with a minimal amount of effort.
GSM already has cryptographically strong hash functions available for use and should be
able to be modified to do the single hash of the Kc value to increase the security of
communication. We have not done a full evaluation of the security scheme but it does
resolve the issues that come about due to the GSM and UMTS integration as shown in the
previous sections. The modification should be easily applied to UMTS devices in their
support of the GSM protocols and add the increased security that the change would
provide. The other advantage of this modification is that when the GSM protocols are
removed when they are no longer required in the future, this change will then be removed
as well making it much more self contained than the changes to the UMTS protocol that we
propose. The deployment of this solution would require software updates to be done over
multiple world wide networks and would need to be a large managed project for the
network operators.
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Chapter 4
AUTHENTICATION FOR MEDICAL
WIRELESS SENSOR NETWORKS
Authentication is the first step in ensuring the safety, privacy and security of user
information in a medical wireless sensor network system. The following sections will
detail a scenario on usage of an M-WSN and how each component will authenticate to the
secure system. Please note that the scenario will have areas that are numbered for future
reference during discussion of our protocol.
4.1 Scenario: Patient Monitoring after Surgery
1 - A patient John Smith has just undergone a surgical procedure - coronary artery
bypass surgery. The attending physician, Dr. Michael Jones, wishes to monitor John Smith
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for any issues that could arise after the surgery. The sensor network that the physician
wishes to deploy consists of multiple sensors (blood pressure, EKG, heart rate, and
temperature) and a single smart control node which are then placed on John Smith shortly
after the surgery to be able to monitor his critical health metrics related to the surgery.
2 - The clinical staff will have the smart control node in an unassigned state
authenticate to the clinical server. The staff will then log into the server during a secure
encrypted session and then select the patient during this session on the device.
3 - The clinical staff will then take each sensor and place it in close proximity to the
smart control node and depress the reset button on the sensor node. The sensor will send a
registration request to the smart control node which will then display information on a
screen that will need user input to approve the sensor. The staff will verify that the sensor
is the correct sensor and approve the connection of the sensor to the MWSN. The sensor
will authenticate against the smart control node which will use information from the
clinical server to complete the authentication. The registration will be maintained in both
the smart control node and the clinical server. 3 will be repeated for each sensor.
4 -This session on the smart control node will then be terminated by the clinician.
This ends the sensor and smart control node registration phase.
5 - The smart control node will then authenticate to the clinical server using the
selected patient identity of John Smith. A command will be sent to the sensors to begin
sending information to the smart control node which will process the information and send
the telemetry recorded from the sensor nodes to the clinical server.
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John Smith is very quickly back on his feet and able to roam throughout the hospital
for the remainder of his stay; the physical activity and freedom increase his happiness and
rate of recovery. During his roaming John will move from one Wi-Fi hotspot to another
within the hospital. The smart control node will use the same session information from the
previous authentication to continue communicating with the clinical server. The
information from the sensors has shown that John has no critical issues in the two days
following the surgery and is recovering very well. Instead of requiring all 4 days of
recovery the patient is allowed to return to his home with the sensor network (sensors and
smart control node) attached and monitoring his vital signs for the next two weeks to
ensure that there are no issues.
6 - During the two weeks the smart control node runs out of power and requires
recharging; the loss of power requires the smart control node to re-authenticate against the
clinical server.
7 – The power loss also requires the sensors to re-authenticate against the smart
control node. This is done without a need to authenticate the sensor against the clinical
server.
8 - While John is moving from the hospital to his home the smart control node will
continue to communicate with the clinical server over cellular networks as well as John’s
home network (The configuration to use the Wi-Fi in John’s home is available on the smart
control node).
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9 - On the twelfth day John has an arrhythmia. The sensors send the encrypted EKG
information to the smart control node which then deciphers that the data is an arrhythmia.
The smart control node sends this alert information to the clinical server. The clinical
server notifies Dr Jones of the issue and he takes all necessary precautions in ensuring the
safety of his patient. The clinical system also notifies relevant hospital staff; they dispatch
a less expensive patient transfer service to pick up Mr. Smith without requiring the use of
an emergency service ambulance which would be better deployed to a more critical health
event.
Mr. Smith is notified by smart control node that he should seek medical assistance
and that a transport service is on route to pick him up at his current location (GPS
functionality) and that he should not drive due to his condition. The smart control node
also sends commands to the sensors to increase their rate of monitoring and communication
to have better information during the clinical event.
The sensors allow Dr. Jones to have long term monitoring of the recovery of his
patient while freeing the patient not only from the restriction of a recovery room/bed but
also of the requirement of being in the hospital for an extended period simply for
observation. The sensors also decrease the nursing effort currently required to gather
patient telemetry in hospital.
When Dr. Jones had the sensor nodes applied to Mr. Smith the sensors were
configured to start sending the data to the smart control node. The smart control node
would do some minor processing of the data to see if there are any critical alerts or
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maintenance alerts that need to be given to the patient such as data indicating a health
emergency or a sensor that is no longer properly placed or out of power. The smart control
node then sends the clinical information to the clinical server for storage and further
processing. The clinical server can then create alerts or be accessed by user applications or
other systems; this foreign access will not be discussed. To achieve the goals of security,
privacy and safety of the patient and the information sent over the network, in Section 4.1
and 4.2, we will be discussing the authentication of the smart control and sensor nodes
against each other and the clinical server.
As described there are 3 different types of devices considered in this scenario. The
clinical server maintains the keys of the sensor nodes, and smart control nodes as well as
the clinical information gathered from those nodes. The smart control node gathers the
data from the sensor nodes, processes that data to a minor extent for alerts and other
immediate uses, and forwards that data to the clinical server while migrating over wireless
networks and the internet. The sensor nodes collect the clinical patient data and forward
that data to the smart control node.
The solution we are proposing is a general solution that will meet the requirements of
the scenario presented and other possible uses for clinical requirements. The scenario is to
be used to understand the application of the sensor network system and how it is both novel
and applicable to the needs of health systems worldwide.
4.1.1 Smart Control Node Authentication
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The communication routing between the smart control node and the clinical server
can go over wireless and physical networks, as well as the internet. The smart control node
will already have been connected wirelessly to the network in the hospital using their
supported Wi-Fi protocols. The clinical staff will establish a connection to the clinical
server to select the patient for the smart control node to monitor shown in Figure 4.1which
is how this protocol is used to support the security requirement mentioned in our scenario
number 2. The SmartId and KSmart are preloaded onto the smart control node before
distribution to the clinical environment. These two preloaded values act similarly to the
IMSI and K in the UMTS authentication protocols as shown in Section 3.2.2 and Figure
3.2. To create this connection the smart control node will use the value of -1 along with a
timestamp and KSmart to generate the SmartRES, the ClinRES`, KSE and KSI as output from
the secure hash functions A1, A2, A3 and A4 described at the end of this section.
Figure 4.1: Initial authentication of smart control node to do patient agreement and sensor attachment.
Chapter 4:
Authentication for Medical Wireless Sensor Networks
62
The smart control node will then send a registration message with the SmartId and
the SmartRES to the clinical server. The clinical server will use the SmartId to locate the
KSmart and generate the SmartRES` to authenticate the smart control node. Then clinical
server will generate the other values and respond to the smart control node with the
ClinRES. The smart control node will then validate the ClinRES and the mutual
authentication and session key generation will be complete. The session will be created
and the keys KSE and KSI are used to encrypt and perform integrity on the remaining steps
in the patient and sensor registration process.
The clinical staff will then enter a username and password into the smart control node
for the server to verify their credentials. The clinical staff will then be able to select the
patient from a list available on the clinical server and confirm the linking of the patient to
the device. After the patient has been selected, the clinical staff can then proceed to link
each sensor to the smart control node. By depressing a reset button on the sensor, the
SenseId will be broadcast by the sensor node and the control node will display the SenseId
and sensor type. The clinical staff can then accept that sensor as linked to the smart control
node which will then have the smart control node store the SenseId and the clinical server
will create and store the relationship between the smart control node and the sensor node.
This process is shown in the next section. This is number 3 in the scenario. Once the
patient has been confirmed and the sensors added to the device, the registration session will
be terminated as described in number 4 in the scenario.
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To authenticate the smart control node to the clinical server after the initial patient
agreement and sensor node attachment, the following protocol shown in Figure 4.2 will be
used. This protocol supports the security requirement mentioned in number 5 and 6 of the
scenario. The smart control node will use the shared key KSmart along with a current
timestamp as well as the patientID to create the session encryption key (KSE), the session
integrity key (KSI), the smart control node response (SmartRES), and the clinical server
expected response (ClinRES`) using the cryptographic hashing algorithms A1, A2, A3, and
A4 (these functions are described in Section 4.1.2 below) with the exception of -1 being
replaced by patientID. The smart node will send the SmartId, and SmartRES to the clinical
server. The Clinical Server will receive the information and verify the timestamp as larger
than the last authentication timestamp within a pre-defined time skew. Then it will use the
SmartId to find the shared key KSmart which is then used along with the Timestamp to
create the SmartRES` to verify the SmartRES as having originated from the appropriate
smart control node. The clinical server will also generate a ClinRES which is sent
encrypted back to the smart control node. The smart control node will then verify the
ClinRES by using the previously generated ClinRES`.
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Figure 4.2: Authentication of smart control node while collecting patient telemetry.
4.1.2 Cryptographic Hash Functions
The hash functions used, shown in Figure 4.3, are at the discretion of the provider of
the smart control node depending on the limitations of the hardware and requirements of
the system. The hash could be SHA-3 or another cryptographically secure hashing
algorithm. We show the equations with the desired input into each hash function shown
below. The string input is used to create different hash output values for each of the
different algorithms.
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The hashing equations show how each will create the desired value such as the
expected responses from each of the smart control node or the clinical server or the keys
used for encryption or integrity when communicating after authentication.
SmartRES = A1(-1, KSmart,Ts) = h(“SmartRES”,-1, KSmart,Ts) (4.1)
ClinRES = A2(-1, KSmart,Ts) = h(“ClinRES”,-1, KSmart,Ts) (4.2)
KSE = A3(-1, KSmart,Ts) = h(“KSE”,-1, KSmart,Ts) (4.3)
KSI = A4(-1, KSmart,Ts) = h(“KSI”,-1, KSmart,Ts) (4.4)
4.1.3 Sensor Node Authentication
Sensor nodes will authenticate to the Smart control node to send confidential clinical
patient data over wireless spectrum securely as shown in Figure 4.4. The authentication
shown here is number 3 in the scenario. The sensor will have an identifier (SenseID) and a
pre-shared key (Ksense). Using a fresh and valid Timestamp (Ts) the sensor will use the
B1, B2, B3, B4 and B5 functions to create the KeyGen, EK, IK, SenseMAC and
SenseRES. Similar to the A hashing functions on the smart control node the actual
implementation of the function is left to the provider. The functions are shown in the
equations below:
GenKey = B1(KSense,Ts) = h(“Registration”,KSense,Ts) (4.5)
EK = B2(GenKey,Ts) = h(“EK”, GenKey,Ts) (4.6)
Figure 4.3: Hash Function used to create authentication values.
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IK = B3(GenKey,Ts) = h(“IK”,GenKey,Ts) (4.7)
SenseMAC = B4(GenKey,Ts) = h(“SenseMAC”,GenKey,Ts) (4.8)
SenseRES = B5(GenKey,Ts) = h(“SenseRES”,GenKey,Ts) (4.9)
The sensor will send an authentication request with the SenseID as well as the
generated SenseMAC to the smart control node. The smart control will forward the
SenseID and SenseMAC to the clinical server over the existing secured communication
channel. The clinical server will use the pre-shared KSense and a timestamp to generate a
key (KeyGen), an encryption key EK and the SenseMAC`. The clinical server will verify
the SenseMAC from the sensor against the generated SenseMAC`. Then the KeyGen and
EK will be sent to the smart control node. The smart control node will use KeyGen and a
timestamp to generate IK and SenseRES. SenseRES will be sent to the sensor node for
verification against SenseRES` and secure communication can commence.
Figure 4.4: Sensor node initial authentication.
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Future authentication between the Sensor and the smart control node, shown in
Figure 4.5 will use the previously generated GenKey to create EK, IK, SenseMAC, and
SenseRES on both the sensor and the smart control node removing requests to the clinical
server. This allows for the sensors to be able to re-authenticate against the smart control
node in situations where the communication link to the clinical server is down.
Figure 4.5: Sensor node re-authentication.
4.2 Formal Protocol Analysis
To ensure the protocols we have developed are secure we will use Burrows-Abadi-
Needham logic (BAN logic) [40]. BAN logic has been used to help verify the quality of
different authentication protocols including UMTS authentication [41]. Many other
protocols have been analyzed using BAN analysis [42],[43],[44]. Sadly there was no BAN
analysis done of the GSM/UMTS integration algorithms which may have lead to the
problems with that integration being discovered before deployment. Those issues were
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discussed in Chapter 3 and two different solutions were proposed to solve the problem with
integration. The BAN logic will help us determine whether or not our exchanged
information is trustworthy, and secured against eavesdropping. They attempt to answer the
following questions with their logical framework:
1. What does this protocol achieve?
2. Does this protocol need more assumptions than another one?
3. Does this protocol do anything unnecessary that could be left out without
weakening it?
4. Does this protocol encrypt something that could be sent in clear without
weakening it?
To answer these questions about our protocol we will proceed to use BAN logic to
analyze our different authentication protocols to formally verify their quality. BAN uses
the following constructs:
| :P X P believes X, or P would be entitled to believe X.
:P X P sees X.
|~ :P X P once said X.
| :P X P has jurisdiction over X.
#( ) :X The formula X is fresh.
:KP Q P and Q may use the shared key K to communicate.
:XP Q X is a shared secret known only to P and Q.
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The protocol analysis is performed as follows:
 The idealized protocol is derived from the original one showing each of the
messages sent and received.
 Assumptions about the initial state are written
 Logical formulas are attached to the statements of the protocol as assertions
about the state of the system after each statement
 The logical postulates are applied to the assumptions and the assertions in
order to discover the beliefs held by the parties in the protocol
Initial assumptions are required to guarantee the success of our protocol. We assume
that none of the devices in the protocol have been compromised. We assume that the
encryption, integrity and hashing algorithms are secure. We assume that there are checks
on the timestamps used so that there can be no replay attacks.
The intent of each of our protocols is to achieve mutual authentication and key
agreement which is represented by the following four statements.
| KP P Q  (4.10)
| KQ P Q  (4.11)
| | KP Q P Q   (4.12)
| | KQ P P Q   (4.13)
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Statements (4.10) and (4.11) show that P believes that P and Q share a key and that Q
believes that as well. Statements (4.12) and (4.13) show that P believes that Q believes
that they share a key K and that Q believes that P believes that they share a key K.
Showing that they both believe these 4 statements shows that a protocol achieves mutual
authentication.
4.2.1 BAN analysis of the Smart Control Node Authentication
The authentication protocol involves the smart control node which will be
represented by P and the clinical server represented by S. The intent of the first
authentication protocol is for mutual authentication between the smart control node and the
clinical server which allows those devices to generate session keys for encryption and
integrity to allow the clinical staff to securely log in, select the patient, and assign the
sensor nodes. The intent of the second authentication protocol is for mutual authentication
which allows the smart control node to send the telemetry from the sensors in a securely
encrypted manner with integrity to the clinical server and allow the clinical server to send
commands back to the smart control node with the same security. The two different cases
of authentication will be described with their BAN analysis.
Case 1: Authentication for Registration
To analyze the protocol we first give the assumptions:
| SmartKP P S   (4.14)
| SmartKS P S   (4.15)
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| #( )P Ts (4.16)
| #( )S Ts (4.17)
| | ( ,#( ))SEK SES P P S K   (4.18)
| | ( ,#( ))SIK SIS P P S K   (4.19)
Assumptions (4.14) and (4.15) show that S (clinical server) and P (smart control
node) both share a secret KSmart. The assumptions (4.16) and (4.17) show S and P believe
the freshness of the timestamp Ts. Assumptions (4.18) and (4.19) are that S believes that P
has jurisdiction over the initiation of the session and the creation of the session encryption
and integrity keys and that those keys are fresh. Once the assumptions have been declared
we can proceed to verify the idealized version of the protocol shown in Figure 4.1 which
has two messages first sent from the smart control node to the clinical server (4.20) and a
second message sent from the clinical server to the smart control node (4.21).
Message 1 : , ,P S registration SmartID SmartRES (4.20)
Message 2 :S P ClinRES (4.21)
The BAN analysis can proceed on the protocol by considering the previous
assumptions as well as the idealized protocol. Before P sends the first message to S it will
use a fresh timestamp to create the desired keys for communication during the session.
| SIKP P S  (4.22)
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| SEKP P S  (4.23)
Then P sends the SmartRES to S as shown in Message 1. The results on the clinical
server S are shown below.
, , 1( 1, , )SmartS registration P A K Ts (4.24)
When S receives the message shown it will then proceed to use the identity of P to
reference KSmart to be used in the hashing functions. We see that the addition of the
registration string to the protocol is not required answering question 3; we leave in the
string to allow easy understanding of the protocol. S will then be able to verify that A1(-1,
KSmart ,Ts) is equal to the SmartRES. Once that has been verified the other values can be
believed to be true by S as shown below.
| SIKS P S  (4.25)
| SEKS P S  (4.26)
| | SIKS P P S   (4.27)
| | SEKS P P S   (4.28)
We see that S believes both of the session encryption and integrity keys but that S can
also believe that P believes both of those keys as well since S was able to verify the request
from P. The clinical server S can then respond to P with the ClinRES.
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2( 1, , )SmartP A K Ts (4.29)
P will then verify ClinRES against A2(-1,KSmart,Ts) and proceed to believe the
following statements. If P is able to verify ClinRES then it can be certain that the S is the
appropriate clinical server.
| | SIKP S P S   (4.30)
| | SEKP S P S   (4.31)
Therefore we can see that mutual authentication and key agreement is achieved with
the protocol using BAN analysis shown by statements (4.27), (4.28), (4.30), and (4.31).
The keys can then be used for the secure communication that follows in the registration
protocol.
Case 2: Patient Authentication
To analyze the protocol we first give the assumptions:
| SmartKP P S   (4.32)
| SmartKS P S   (4.33)
| PatientIDP P S   (4.34)
| PatientIDS P S   (4.35)
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| #( )P Ts (4.36)
| #( )S Ts (4.37)
| | ( ,#( ))SEK SES P P S K   (4.38)
| | ( ,#( ))SIK SIS P P S K   (4.39)
The assumptions (4.32) and (4.33) state that S and P share the secret KSmart.
Assumption (4.34) and (4.35) are that S and P both have a unique shared patient identifier.
The next two assumptions (4.36) and (4.37) state that P and S both believe the freshness of
the timestamp. The final two assumptions are that S believes that P has jurisdiction over
the initiation of the session and the creation of the session encryption and integrity keys and
that those keys are fresh. Once the assumptions have been declared we can proceed to
verify the idealized version of the protocol showing the two messages sent as seen in
Figure 4.2.
Message 1 : ,P S SmartID SmartRES (4.40)
Message 2 :S P ClinRES (4.41)
We proceed to do the protocol analysis. Before P sends the first message to S it will
use a fresh timestamp to create the desired keys for communication during the session.
| SIKP P S  (4.42)
| SEKP P S  (4.43)
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Then P sends the SmartRES to S as shown in Message 1. The results on the clinical
server S are shown below.
, 1( , , )SmartS P A PatientID K Ts (4.44)
When S receives the message shown it will then proceed to use the identity of P to
reference KSmart to be used in the hashing functions. S will then be able to verify that
A1(PatientID, KSmart ,Ts) is equal to the SmartRES. Once that has been verified the other
values can be believed to be true by S as shown below.
| SIKS P S  (4.45)
| SEKS P S  (4.46)
| | SIKS P P S   (4.47)
| | SEKS P P S   (4.48)
We see that S believes both of the session encryption and integrity keys but that S can
also believe that P believes both of those keys as well since S was able to verify the request
from P. The clinical server S can then respond to P with the ClinRES.
2( , , )SmartP A PatientID K Ts (4.49)
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P will then verify ClinRES against A2(PatientID,KSmart,Ts) and proceed to believe the
following statements. If P is able to verify ClinRES then it can be certain that the S is the
appropriate clinical server.
| | SIKP S P S   (4.50)
| | SEKP S P S   (4.51)
Therefore we can see that mutual authentication and key agreement is achieved with
the protocol using BAN analysis. The keys can then be used for the secure communication
for the patient telemetry.
4.2.2 BAN analysis of Sensor Node Authentication
The authentication protocol involves the sensor node (N), smart control node (P) and
the clinical server (S). The first protocol discussed will describe the method of registering
the sensor node with the smart control node by doing an initial authentication with the
clinical server. The second protocol will describe the re-authentication of the sensor node
against the smart control node.
Case 1: Authentication and Registration of Sensor Node
To analyze the protocol we first give the assumptions:
| KSenseN N S   (4.52)
| KSenseS N S   (4.53)
| #( )N Ts (4.54)
Chapter 4:
Authentication for Medical Wireless Sensor Networks
77
| #( )P Ts (4.55)
| #( )S Ts (4.56)
| | ( ,#( ))EKS N N P EK   (4.57)
| | ( ,#( ))IKS N N P IK   (4.58)
| | ( ,#( ))EKP N N P EK   (4.59)
| | ( ,#( ))IKP N N P IK   (4.60)
| KP P S  (4.61)
| KS P S  (4.62)
The assumptions (4.52) and (4.53) represent the fact that S and N both have a shared
secret KSense. The next 3 assumptions (4.54), (4.55) and (4.56) relate to each S, N and P
having the freshness of a timestamp. The next 4 assumptions (4.57), (4.58), (4.59), and
(4.60) are that S and P believe that N has jurisdiction over the creation of EK, IK and the
freshness of those keys. The final two assumptions (4.61) and (4.62) show that P and S
have already authenticated each other and both share a key(s) for secure communication.
Once the assumptions have been declared we can proceed to verify the idealized
version of the protocol showing all four messages shown in Figure 4.4.
Message 1 : ,N P SenseID SenseMAC (4.63)
Message 2 :{ , }KP S SenseID SenseMAC (4.64)
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Message 3 :{ }KS P GenKey (4.65)
Message 4 :P N SenseRES (4.66)
The protocol shall then be analyzed. N will create a fresh timestamp to be used in the
hashing functions to generate the expected shared keys as well as the hashes for
authentication. This leads N to believe the following statements.
| EKN N P  (4.66)
| IKN N P  (4.66)
Then N sends the SenseMAC to P as shown in Message 1. P then forwards the same
message to S over the secure channel.
, 4( , )P SenseID B GenKey Ts (4.67)
, 4( , )S SenseID B GenKey Ts (4.68)
P does nothing with the received message other than forward it on to S. S can then
use the SenseID to find KSense to generate GenKey for the B4 hashing function and verify
the SenseMAC. We see that the message sent from P to S need not be encrypted and can
be sent in the clear answering question 4; but as we use the secure channel for all other
communication we will leave the message encrypted. If the SenseMAC is verified S can
be certain of the identity of N and send GenKey securely to P as shown below.
Chapter 4:
Authentication for Medical Wireless Sensor Networks
79
P GenKey (4.69)
When P sees GenKey it can then generate the EK and IK for communication as well
as the SenseRES. It is required that this message be encrypted to protect the value of
GenKey. P can also safely make the following belief statements.
| EKP N P  (4.70)
| IKP N P  (4.71)
| | EKP N N P   (4.72)
| | IKP N N P   (4.73)
P will then send the following message to N to complete the protocol.
N SenseRES (4.74)
N can then verify the sent SenseRES with the hash of B5(GenKey,Ts). This
verification will allow N to make the following belief statements.
| | EKN P N P   (4.75)
| | IKN P N P   (4.76)
Therefore mutual authentication between the sensor node and the smart control node
is complete and secure communication can commence.
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Case 2: Re-Authentication of Sensor Node
There is one less actor in this protocol as S is not required for the re-authentication.
To analyze the protocol we first give the assumptions:
| GenKeyN N P  (4.77)
| GenKeyP N P  (4.78)
| #( )N Ts (4.79)
| #( )P Ts (4.80)
| | ( ,#( ))EKP N N P EK   (4.81)
| | ( ,#( ))IKP N N P IK   (4.82)
The first two assumptions (4.77) and (4.78) are that P and N both have a shared secret
GenKey. The next 2 assumptions (4.79) and (4.80) relate to N and P having the freshness
of a timestamp. The final 2 assumptions (4.81) and (4.82) are that P believes that N has
jurisdiction over the creation of EK, IK and the freshness of those keys.
Once the assumptions have been declared we can proceed to verify the idealized
version of the protocol.
Message 1 : ,N P SenseID SenseMAC (4.83)
Message 2 :P N SenseRES (4.84)
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The protocol shall then be analyzed. N will create a fresh timestamp to be used in the
hashing functions to generate the expected shared keys as well as the hashes for
authentication. This leads N to believe the following statements.
| EKN N P  (4.85)
| IKN N P  (4.86)
Then N sends the SenseMAC to P as shown in Message 1.
, 4( , )P SenseID B GenKey Ts (4.87)
P then uses the SenseID to find GenKey for the B4 hashing function and verify the
SenseMAC. If the SenseMAC is verified P can be certain of the identity of N and P can
then generate the EK and IK for communication as well as the SenseRES. P can also
safely make the following belief statements.
| EKP N P  (4.88)
| IKP N P  (4.89)
| | EKP N N P   (4.90)
| | IKP N N P   (4.91)
P will then send the following message to N to complete the protocol.
N SenseRES (4.92)
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N can then verify the sent SenseRES with the hash of B5(GenKey,Ts). This
verification will allow N to make the following belief statements.
| | EKN P N P   (4.93)
| | IKN P N P   (4.94)
Therefore mutual re-authentication between the sensor node and the smart control
node is complete and secure communication can commence.
4.3 Summary
The protocol developed for authentication for the smart control node creates an
understanding between the smart control node and the clinical server of shared keys for
authentication and integrity to be used for communication. The original protocol allows a
clinician to attach a patient to the smart control node for collection of telemetry. The
second protocol allows the patient telemetry to be sent from the smart control node to the
clinical server in a secure manner and for command and control instructions to be sent in
either direction. The BAN analysis of the protocols shows that mutual authentication and
key agreement is achieved for both of these protocols. We have limited messages and use
hashing functions to limit the resource usage.
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The protocol developed for the sensor nodes allows the smart control node to
communicate securely with the sensors to send or receive information. Mutual
authentication and key agreement is achieved between the smart control node and the
sensor node while using the clinical server as a mediator. The re-authentication allows for
the sensors to communicate securely with the smart control node even in the absence of a
connection to the clinical server. All of the protocols use minimal resources and messaging
to achieve the desired results as can be seen with the BAN analysis.
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Chapter 5
PATIENT PRIVACY
Patient privacy is of the utmost concern in any clinical system. Clinicians will try to
gather as much data as possible since any minor facet of a patient’s life can have an impact
on their health. To have a full picture and be able to fully analyze the problems a patient is
having, health care providers would prefer to have knowledge of even the most minor of
details. There are many different types of health information that heathcare providers will
try to record and collect about a patient to be able to have a robust picture of their health as
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shown in Table 5-1. Other data that clinicians try to collect may not seem to be
immediately medically relevant but demographic information can also be used in patient
diagnosis. Some of the types of demographic information stored by healthcare providers
are listed in Table 5-2.
Table 5-1: Types of clinical data stored in clinical systems.
Diseases Disabilities Predicted Health Indicators
Medications Mental Health Psychological Stability
Psychological Therapy Diet Drug Use (Legitimate and illicit)
Exercise Habits Genetic Code Sexual Habits (disclosed or supposed)
Treatments Allergies Family Disease History
Height Weight Laboratory Test Results
Imaging
Table 5-2: Types of demographic data stored in clinical systems.
Education Employment (and History) Marital Status
Family Relationships Address (and History) Phone Number (and History)
Birth Date Religion Language
Sexual Orientation Health Card Number Drivers License Number
Race GPS Location
Healthcare providers try to collect and store the most intimate details of our lives to
be able to properly diagnose any health issues a patient may experience. This information
could be put to many nefarious uses if it gets into the hands of the wrong people. To limit
patient exposure to black mail and other undesired effects of the release of this information
it is required that patient privacy be maintained.
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Patient Privacy must be maintained to limit the release of this private information to
only those clinicians directly responsible for the care of a patient. This implies that the
sensitive information will not be released to clinicians not responsible for the care of the
patient or to any outside party that should not have access to or knowledge of the sensitive
information. Both the Canadian and American governments have tried to tackle the issue
of patient privacy by crafting laws that apply to the care and control of patient information.
As mentioned in section 2.1 Canada has developed the Personal Information Protection and
Electronic Documents Act and the United States has enacted the Health Insurance
Portability and Accountability Act. This legislation calls for the utmost care to be taken
with patient/personal information.
When considering new advances in clinical care and with the advent of wireless
technology, the amount of information that is collected by clinical providers is growing
massively. It is now possible for many different methods to breach patient privacy. A
passive observer can simply record the information a patient system is transmitting to
discern the location of the patient. If the information is transmitted without care for the
confidentiality of the information then the observer can have direct access to that
information. Active attacks on privacy can come from many directions. The wireless
communication medium is particularly attractive to attack. Other active attacks on patient
privacy can be carried out by employees and clinicians related to the health care provider
that abuse their privileges to discover the personal information of a patient for which they
do not provide care. These types of attacks need to be addressed by defining the types of
privacy that should be afforded to the patient.
Chapter 5:
87
The location of a patient can be used to discern some personal information because it
is possible to surmise the sexual orientation of a patient that visits establishments known
for homosexual or heterosexual activity. The home address of a patient can be discovered
or the work address can be found simply by observation of the communication sent by the
patient. Protecting the patient location from observers and attackers will be referred to as
location privacy.
Patient identity can also be discovered by tracking the identity of the wireless devices
if they are brought into an environment where the identity of the patient can be learnt.
Then the identity of the patient can be associated with the wireless identity for the entire
time the wireless device uses those identities. This type of protection of privacy that hides
the identity will be referred to as identification privacy.
The information stored in a system can be used to inappropriately breach the privacy
of a patient. If the information is anonymized or unlinked from the patient then it could be
protected from unauthorized access if the methodology for anonymizing or unlinking still
allows authorized users to access the data. Creating this anonymous linkage will be
referred to as information privacy.
5.1 Location Privacy
The location of a patient can be used to infer many different aspects about their
personal life and health. If that location is not kept private it is possible for observers and
attackers to discern private information that should be protected.
5.1.1 Mist Protocol
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Maglogiannis, et al. [45] describe a modified Mist protocol, originally designed by Al-
Muhtadi, et al. [46] that is used to keep the location of the patient private. The patient will perform
a registration phase with the system to select the desired Lighthouse that has knowledge of the
patient identity but does not know the location of the patient as shown in Figure 5.1 which shows
the 4 steps to complete the registration process required to begin the process of creating a Mist
circuit. The user sends a request for registration to the Mist portal. The portal replies with a list of
routers within the hierarchy that are available as lighthouses for the user. The user then selects the
desired lighthouse where ones closer to the user will increase the efficiency of communication at the
cost of a potential loss in privacy and choosing a lighthouse closer to the root of the hierarchy will
increase privacy while causing a loss in communication efficiency. After the selection of the
chosen Mist router to act as a lighthouse a Mist circuit is then established between the user and the
lighthouse.
Figure 5.1: Registration in MIST protocol.
To create the Mist circuit the user will send
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The Mist Portal that the patient is attached to knows the location of the patient but not the
identity. Any communication with the patient is initiated with the lighthouse node (any routing
node can be the lighthouse) in the MIST network. The lighthouse node then relays the information
through the Mist routing nodes to the portal node. Each of these Mist routing nodes will have an
identity lookup table for routing the information to the next router until the portal node is finally
reached. The portal knows the location of the patient and will send the information to the patient
devices but the portal does not know the identity of the patient that is used to identify them in the
system. The path of communication is shown in Figure 5.2.
Figure 5.2: Path of communication in MIST protocol.
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The figure shows two different devices that are going to communicate over a MIST
enabled network. The MIST routers can either act as a router or lighthouse for
communication purposes. When acting as a router the router maintains a table of aliases
for each device that is lower on the tree. The Users A and B can be any combination of
patient or clinician in the system that wish to have real time information from the other user
available for their use. When user B attempts to communicate with user A they use their
lighthouse to send the information and will discover the lighthouse of User A as the
destination.
The resulting communication network allows for communication with the patient
while protecting the location of the patient from discovery. The modification proposed by
Maglogiannis, et al. [45] allows for different lighthouses to be used for outbound
messaging instead of the one that the patient system registers with to hide their location.
This increases the difficulty in discovering the location of the patient if most information is
inbound into the system from the patient location. The basic principle in this architecture is
that each Mist router acts as a proxy removing the identifying information and replacing it
with information stored in a lookup table.
5.1.2 The Onion Protocol (TOR)
Outside of a controlled clinical environment the Mist routing protocol will not be able
to address location privacy due to the usage of the internet as a communication channel
between the patient sensor system and the clinical server and the lack of control over the
devices outside of the clinical environment. TOR [47] is a widely deployed network
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overlay that provides online anonymity to conceal a user’s location or usage from anyone
conducting network surveillance or traffic analysis.
TOR helps protect privacy by distributing transactions over several places on the
internet so that no single attacker can link the patient to the hospital. The patient creates a
private network pathway by building a circuit of encrypted connections through different
relays in the TOR network. The relays never know the complete path that a data packet has
taken. The nature of the TOR network creates location anonymity and privacy for the
patient.
TOR also allows for the creation of hidden services that are only available within the
TOR network. This allows the hospital to create a protected service which protects the
location of the service. Hiding the services lets the patient know that the fact they are
communicating with the hospital will be hidden from any attackers.
5.2 Identification Privacy
When using any technology there is usually some identity applied to ensure that the
client technology can be properly recognized by the servers. This identity can be related to
the patient and then used to gather information on the patient or to track the patient causing
a breach of their privacy. To conceal this identity Garcia-Morchon, et al. [48] use privacy
aware identification. The framework they have developed requires a smart tamper resistant
healthcare card (HCC) as an integral part of their security. The healthcare card contains the
Unique Patient Identifier (UPI) which can be used in any clinical system to identify the
patient similar to an Ontario health insurance plan number or social security number. The
privacy aware identification creates a hierarchy of pseudonyms which are derived from the
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UPI but cannot be linked back to the UPI without authorization of the patient or central
healthcare authority which prevents unauthorized users from linking the patient identity to
the data generated in the Personal Area Network (PAN). The IDPAN|MSN is a master session
identifier for the PAN and MSN relationship which is the only identifier known to the
MSN (the MSN has no knowledge of the UPI). The IDPAN|MSN is generated with a hash
function of the UPI, the MSN identifier (IDMSN) and the PAN master symmetric key
(KMaster-UPI). The KMaster-UPI is a secret symmetric key kept on the HCC.
ܫܦ௉஺ே |ெ ௌே = ℎ(ܷܲܫห|ܫܦெ ௌே |หܭெ ௔௦௧௘௥ି௎௉ூ) (5.1)
ܫܦ௉஺ே |ெ ௌேି௜= ℎ(ܫܦ௉஺ே |ெ ௌேห|ℎ(ܭெ ௔௦௧௘௥ି௎௉ூ||ܫܦெ ௌே )|หܵ ௜) (5.2)
The equations are used to generate the identification of the Personal Security
Manager when connecting to any telemetry system on the patient. The identity will change
with each communication session (Si) to hide the identity over a long period of
communication as shown in equation 5.2. Equation 5.1 will be used while the MSN
communicates with the PSM to generate IDPAN|MSN this is done over Body Coupled
Communication (BCC) to ensure it is not discovered. The identifiers are updated with the
change of the session which keeps the patient identifier private.
5.3 Information Privacy
One of the more difficult areas of privacy to maintain is information privacy. To
maintain the anonymized or unlinked information from the patient while still being able to
have a usable system takes extreme care and effort. The major concern to information
privacy is the inappropriate use of access and collaborative use of access to compromise
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patient privacy. Clinicians that can see one patient in most patient systems can usually see
all of the patients in a system. This can lead to a clinician searching and breaching the
privacy of patients that the clinician is not treating. Sun, et al. [49] attempt to preserve
information privacy during Emergency Response situations with Wireless body sensor
networks. The scheme presented protects patient information from undesired breaches of
privacy after access has been given to the emergency medical technician (EMT). The EMT
needs access to the immediate (based on a time period) and relevant clinical information of
the patient but does not need as much historical information or other non-emergency
information. The scheme involves the unlinkability of information in the systems that store
the medical data causing anonymity of the data.
The patient PDA is initially registered with a central credential authority where the
patient obtains an anonymous credential for future authentication with the remote server.
The PDA stores the monitored medical data collected in each time period with an unlikable
sequence number that the EMT cannot link to the medical data collected in other time
periods unless authorized by the patient. When the PDA gains knowledge of a possible
emergency from abnormal signals from the body sensors it will contact the primary
physician who will evaluate the situation and request emergency services if required. The
EMT that responds will demand the necessary medical data from the PDA which may
accept only a reasonable date range for the request. The PDA will then give the desired
identifiers to the EMT to gain access to the requested data. The identifiers given cannot be
used to retrieve other patient information and cannot be linked to other data on the patient.
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The data storage on the remote server that both the patient and the EMT use requires
the patient PDA to follow a preparation phase on the data to create the unlinkability. The
PDA selects a random secret seed (RSS) as input into a pseudo random number generator
(PRNG). The PRNG will generate pseudorandom serial numbers (s1 … sn) for each update
period (3-5 days) of clinical data. The PDA will then compute tags as a hash of each serial
number where ti = h(si). Those tags are then sent to the server with the medical data to be
used for identification of the data by the EMT. When the EMT requests access to the data
the PDA will use the RSS for the desired and approved periods to generate the serial
numbers and then the tags. The tags are sent to the EMT to be able to retrieve the desired
data. The EMT is unable to generate other tags that are related to the patient from the tags
given which shows the unlinkability but the EMT can gain access to the required data to
properly handle the medical emergency.
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Chapter 6
CONCLUDING REMARKS AND FUTURE WORK
The application of wireless communication to the medical field will have many
beneficial and far reaching impacts on the way healthcare is delivered. The legislated
requirements relating to the handling of clinical and personal information require that
security be at the core of any system developed for a clinical application. HIPAA in the
United States of America and PIPEDA in Canada are two examples of government
legislation that have a direct impact on the way that health and personal information can be
collected and transmitted. Major issues are the confidentiality and integrity of the
information collected and transmitted which requires a strong method of authentication and
key agreement. To address these privacy and legislated issues authentication, key
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agreement, encryption, and integrity hashing are required technologies that need to be
implemented in any Medical Wireless Sensor Network.
The existing wireless authentication frameworks are investigated; these networks are
currently deployed and have undergone extensive testing and have withstood a great
number of real world attacks. The authentication in WEP, WPA and WPA2 are discussed,
showing the problems that existed in the older protocols and how they were overcome by
the next generation of technology and protocols. The issues in WEP are not related to the
encryption algorithm but the implementation of the protocol that cause the weaknesses.
We also investigate the mobile wireless network protocols, showing the different
evolutionary constraints on the systems that are deployed and developed. A major issue
with the integration of GSM and UMTS security protocols is revealed and two solutions
are proposed showing how to increase the security by using simple hashing techniques.
The information gained from examining the existing wireless protocols gave a
foundation for the protocols designed in this thesis. The protocols are designed to achieve
mutual authentication and key agreement for secure communication between the smart
control node, clinical server and sensor nodes use minimal messages. The protocols also
avoid public key encryption due to the increased processing and resources required to
implement public key protocols. The protocols are analyzed using BAN analysis showing
that they are secure and achieve the desired result of mutual authentication and key
agreement.
Other aspects of privacy are then investigated with possible methods of addressing
the privacy issues. Location privacy is of large concern and will need to be addressed and
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the MIST and TOR protocols meet some of the needs of location privacy. The issues of
identification and information privacy are also discussed with an overview on possible
solutions to address those problems.
The protocol developed is an excellent foundation for the implementation of wireless
sensors for healthcare. This thesis addresses the legal requirements of privacy required by
both Canada and the United States. The protocols developed will allow for the application
of sensors to many different areas of clinical telemetry.
6.1 Future Work
The further development of the protocols presented in this thesis, to meet the growing
privacy needs of both patients and clinicians, is a worthwhile avenue of research. The
intent of this researcher is to attempt to create a practical working product for use in clinical
environments and to begin to properly leverage wireless communication within the
healthcare environment.
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